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I. INTRODUCTION

During the past two decades, the number of investment treaties has tripled.'
Today, nearly 170 countries have signed onto one or more Bilateral Investment
Treaties ("BITs").2 These treaties offer foreign investors a series of economic
rights, including the right to arbitrate claims, in hopes of attracting Foreign Direct
Investment ("FDI") that will bring a country infrastructure projects, financing,
know-how, new jobs and, economic stability.3
While the number of investment treaties has increased, there has also been a
marked increase in FDI, which surged from $200 billion in 1990 to over $1
trillion in 2000. 4 With the increase in investor rights and investment levels, it is
not surprising investors have begun to bring claims to enforce their rights when
government conduct arguably has an adverse effect on their investment. Since
1985, investors have initiated at least 219 claims-two thirds of which have been

filed since 2002-and several pending claims have been valued in excess of $100
million 5.

1. In 1992, there were approximately 700 BITs, and by 1995, there were more than 900 BITs between
150 countries. MIRIAN KENE OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 2 n. 10 (1999). Today there
are over 2100 BITS. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Arbitration: Privatizing Public
InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1522-23 (2005) [hereinafter
Franck, Legitimacy Crisis]; see also Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under
Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47
(2005) [hereinafter Franck, Bright Future] (describing the surge in investment treaties); Antonio R. Parra,
Settlement of Investment Disputes: The Experience of ICSID in Transition Countries and Elsewhere, in
EUROPEAN BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, LAW IN TRANSITION: CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

39 (2001), available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs1egalU5083.htm [hereinafter LAW IN TRANSITION];
UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes and Policy Implications, TD/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d62_en.pdf [hereinafter Policy Implications].
2. Parra, supra note 1, at 39.
3. Franck, Bright Future,supra note 1, at 48-49.
4. See UNITED NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT: PROMOTING 2001: PROMOTING LINKAGES, xiii,
9-10 (2001), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir01full.en.pdf [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2001] (noting the increase in FDI and finding worldwide foreign investment was in the order of $1.3
trillion in 2000). In 1980, FDI was estimated at $40 billion; by 1994 it had increased to $222 billion. By 1995,
estimates of FDI reached $315 billion. OMALU, supra note 1, at 1-2; see also Rati Ram & Kevin Honglin
Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Evidencefrom Cross-CountryDatafor the 1990s, 51
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 205, 205 (2002), available at http://www.joumals.uchicago.
edu/EDCC/joumal/issues/v5lnl/510109/510109.web.pdf (suggesting that in 1990 FDI was in the order of
$198.4 billion); but see UNITED NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D 3 (2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/wir2005chlen.pdf [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005] (stating that global FDI inflows
declined 41% in 2001, 13% in 2002, and 12% in 2003, but rose 2% in 2004).
5. Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard: Treaty Disputes, AM. LAW. (June 2005), available at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/treaty0605.html; see also Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note
1, at 1521; Parra, supra note 1, at 39; Jeswald W. Salacuse, Explanations For The Increased Recourse To
Treaty-Based Investment Dispute Settlement: Resolving The Struggle of Life Against Form?, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: IS THE REGIME THREATENED BY ITS SUCCESS? (Karl P. Sauvant ed.) (forthcoming 2007).
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It is unclear whether the expansion of the BIT network and the right to
arbitrate treaty claims has incentivized foreign investment. 6 The existence of an
investment treaty is one variable that may affect decisions to invest
internationally. Other critical variables influencing investment choices can
include the potential financial risks and benefits to the investor,7 the stability of
an investment environment,8 the availability of appropriate human capital, 9 access
to effective enforcement procedures,' embedded personal and professional
relationships," and other factors. 2 While the availability of investment treaty
6.

See
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CO-OPERATION,

INTERNATIONAL

35-37 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/62/35032229.pdf
(observing the link between FDI flows and the existence of investment treaties with OECD countries but
declining to comment upon whether the treaties cause FDI).
7. Presuming that investors are rational actors who seek to maximize their profits and minimize their
risks, the literature has sought to isolate those variables most likely to create incentives to invest internationally.
See Magnus Blomstrom & Ari Kokko, Working Paper 168: The Economics of Foreign Direct Investment
Incentives (Jan. 2003), available at http://web.hhs.se/eijswp//168.pdf (analyzing the rationale behind providing
incentives to attract FDI and arguing for attracting FDI); Andrew Charlton, Working Paper No. 203: Incentive
Bidding for Mobile Investment: Economic Consequences and Potential Responses (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/2492289.pdf (analyzing the main costs and benefits of investment
incentives and emphasizing the positive and negative consequences of competition between countries and
regions offering investors such incentives); see also Stephen M. Penner, InternationalInvestment and the
Prudent Investor Rule: The Trustee's Duty to ConsiderInternationalInvestment Vehicles, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L.
601, 639-41 (1995) (observing that "it would be impossible to determine the desirability of investing in a
particular international asset without being able to at least estimate the asset's expected return" and that
investors need additional information about particular risks before making an investment).
8. See generally THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETI'ER INVESTMENT
CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 19-24, 79-80 (2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/
Resources/complete.report.pdf [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT]; see also Yitzhak Hadari,
Attracting ForeignInvestments in Selected Developing Countries and the Desirable Policy, 24 INT'L LAW. 121,
122 (1990) (suggesting that where investment incentives are unstable they become less effective in attracting
investment, observing that "heavy-handed bureaucracy and administrative procedures are major discouragements to investment" and noting that efforts to streamline a regulatory regime may lead to increases in
investment); Penner, supra note 7, at 639-40 (observing that regulatory risk may adversely affect investment
decisions).
9. See Koji Miyamoto, Working Paper211: Human Capital Formation and Foreign Direct Investment
in Developing Countries, (July 2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/25/5888700.pdf (reviewing the literature on human capital formation and skills development and analyzing their impact on FDI); see
also PEADAR KIRBY, MACROECONOMIC SUCCESS AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY: LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICA
FROM THE CELTIC TIGER 26-27 (2003) (describing Ireland's investment in education as part if its recipe for
economic development).
10. See LAW IN TRANSITION, supra note 1, at 18-22, 24 (referring to the need for an "acceptable degree
of legal and judicial certainty of contract enforcement").
11. See generally Nina Bandell, Embedded Economies: Social Relations as Determinants of Foreign
Direct Investment in Centraland Eastern Europe, 81 Soc. FORCES 411 (2002); Ying Qiu, PersonalNetworks,
Institutional Involvement, and Foreign Direct Investment Flows into China's Interior, 81 ECON. GEOGRAPHY
261 (2005).
12. For example, the availability and scope of political risk insurance coverage from entities such as the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) or the Multi-lateral Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
might influence investment decisions. See generally Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing
Political Risk In Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA &
OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1994) (discussing the availability of
political risk insurance); see also infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing a variety of factors
INVESTMENT
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arbitration may play some role in influencing investment determinations, the
specific scope and impact of that role has not been articulated. Nevertheless, to
the extent that dispute resolution mechanisms in investment treaties may
influence an investor's decision to invest or affect the manner in which they
structure their transaction," they are worthy of consideration-particularly as
countries are targeting effective alternative
dispute resolution systems as a
4
method of fostering foreign investment.'
This article focuses on a small aspect of the puzzle of how, if at all,
investment treaties affect foreign investment. Specifically, it will consider the
provocative and unexplored question of the role that dispute resolution
mechanisms-particularly investment treaty arbitration-play in foreign
investment. First, this article provides a background on the role of investment
treaties and investment treaty arbitration. Second, it considers how investment
treaty arbitration might impact investment decisions. This article then gathers the
current empirical evidence that analyzes the general impact investment treaties
have on foreign investment decisions. Next, it considers the particular impact
investment treaty arbitration, as a specific term of an investment treaty, may have
on FDI. This article develops potential models for explaining current links
between investment levels and dispute resolution mechanisms; it then speculates
on how investment treaty arbitration may create incentives for foreign investment
by fostering the development of the rule of law. Ultimately, this article suggests
that while investment treaty arbitration may not directly trigger investment, the
availability of this dispute resolution mechanism is a factor in an overall
decisional matrix. As such, it should play a role in promoting development and
the rule of law.'5
affecting investment decisions).
13. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1535 n.46 (observing that investors may structure
their investments in order to take advantage of favorable investment treaty rights); see also JULIAN D.M. LEW,
LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 769
(2003) (noting that "investments made by a subsidiary of a global corporation will now fall under at least one
BIT").
14. Express India, Effective ADR Mechanism Can Fetch More FDI than China (Nov. 5, 2005), available
at http://www.expressindia.comfullstory.php?newsid=57809.
15. While a thorough review of the literature is beyond the scope of this article, the concept of the "rule
of law" has been used differently in varying contexts. See, e.g. Faiz Ahmed, Judicial Reform in Afghanistan: A
Case Study in the New CriminalProcedure Code, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 95 n. 11 (defining
"rule of law not as a tangible political or legal condition, nor a political system based on Western notions of
liberal democracy, but as a conceptual goal in which all members of a society (regardless of wealth or status)
normatively abide by publicly known limits, and face legally-sanctioned punishment for transgressing them");
Ash U. B5li, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J.
INT'L L. 431, 446-47 (2005) (offering a functional definition of the rule of law in post-conflict situations);
Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners(Carnegie
Endowment: Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Paper 55 2005), available at http://www.Camegie
endowment.org/files/CP55.Belton.FINAL.pdf (articulating different definitions of the rule of law); Ahmed A.
White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law's Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 759, 763-68 (2005) (referring to the concept of the rule of law and articulating a definition related to
capitalism and individual rights); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)

340
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II. INVESTMENT TREATIES: OFFERING INVESTORS SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL REMEDIES

An investment treaty is an agreement made between two or more sovereigns6
that safeguards investments made in the territory of the signatory countries.'
Sovereigns purportedly promulgate these investment treaties as "a means to
satisfy the need to promote and protect foreign investment and with a view to
enhancing the legal framework under which foreign investment operates."' 7
Investment treaties may have other functions. They may signal receptivity to
foreign investments 8 or enhance a nation's credibility as a reputable international
actor.' 9 Irrespective of a government's motivation, the proliferation of investment
treaties marks a paradigm shift in investors' substantive and procedural rights.20
(suggesting that "the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable"). Although Judge Posner expresses some
skepticism about the utility of defining basic terms, given its various usages, a brief definition of the term may
prove useful. See Publications Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.)
(suggesting that "efforts to define intuitive concepts ...are often both futile and unnecessary. We use with
perfect clarity many words that we can't define, such as 'time,' 'number,' 'beauty,' and 'law."'). This article
uses the term "rule of law" to refer to: transparency and availability of law; adherence to announced legal
principles or principled deviation from such principles; and the consistent, reliable, independent and impartial
adjudication of those laws. The author is grateful to Professor Ilhyung Lee for his comments on this point.
16. Franck, Bright Future, supra note 1, at 52. While these treaties typically take the form of Bilateral
Investment Treaties ("BITs"), an emerging trend is the creation of larger, multilateral investment treaties
("MITs"). See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, Bush's Plan to Create Mideast Free Trade Area by 2013 Could Take Off
This Year, BNA WTO REPORTER (Jan. 20, 2006) (discussing the possibility of a Middle-East trade and
investment treaties). MITs, like the North American Free Trade Agreement and Central American Free Trade
Agreement, function in the same way as BITs but provide investment protection on a multilateral basis. North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 612 (1993) (entered into force Jan.
1, 1994), Chapter II [hereinafter NAFTA]; United States Trade Representative, CAFTA-DR Final Text,
Chapter 10, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/
SectionIndex.html [hereinafter CAF'A-DR]; Antonio R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, BilateralInvestment Treaties and MultilateralInstruments on Investment,
12 ICSID REV.-F.I.L.J. 287, 293 (1997) [hereinafter Parra, Provisions] (observing that "multilateral instruments
vary in legal character, [but] they have much in common with each other and with BITs"). They differ in other
respects, however, as they also address trade matters in addition to investment protection. For example, they
typically address issues such as rules of origin, customs obligations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and
cross-border trade in services. See NAFTA, supra note 16, at chs. 4, 5, 7, 15; CAFTA-DR, supra note 16, at
chs. 4, 5, 7, 11.
17. OMALU, supra note 1, at 2; see also Franck, Bright Future, supra note 1;Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand
Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 75-79 (2005) (suggesting the purposes of investment treaties are to (1) protect
investment, (2) liberalize markets, and (3) promote investments); Tom Ginsburg, InternationalSubstitutes for
Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 107, 108
(2005).
18. Kenneth Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 470
(2000) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Economics]; see also Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt
Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998) (noting that
BITs began to take off during the same period that international lawyers began to promote the new international
economic order).
19. Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, InternationalOrganizations and Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 192 (Walter Carlsnaes, et al. eds., 2002); see also Jennifer Tobin and Susan Rose-
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A.

Substantive Investment Rights

Rather than relying on the contested meaning of substantive rights under
customary international law, such as expropriation, investment treaties articulate
specific substantive standards for investment rights. 2' Essentially, investment
treaties offer foreign investors a specific set of substantive rights. Typically,
these rights include guarantees of appropriate compensation for expropriation,
promises of freedom from unreasonable or discriminatory measures, guarantees

of national treatment of the investment, assurances of fair and equitable
treatment, promises that investments will receive full protection and security,
undertakings that a sovereign will honor its obligations, and assurances that FDI
will receive treatment no less favorable than that accorded under international
law.22 In other words, investment treaties promise that host governments will not
subject investors and their investments to inappropriate risks.23

Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 22 (William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 587, June 2003), availableat
http://econpapers.repec.orglpaper/wdipapers/2003-587.htm
[hereinafter Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003]
(outlining the benefits of investment treaties).
20. After an evolution away from gunboat diplomacy and treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation treaties, the first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID 1990S,
UNCTAD/ITE/IITi, Sales No. E.98.II.D.8, 8-10 (1998) [hereinafter UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s]; see
also Franck, Legitimacy Crisis,supra note 1, at 1525-29 (describing the evolution of investment treaties); LAW
IN TRANSITION, supra note 1, at 16 (describing the shift away from "primitive remedies such as hostage taking,
ransom demands and reprisals in ancient times to sophisticated legal frameworks with court enforcement in
modem times").
21. The meanings of some standards may be clearer than disputed definitions under international law,
but parties may nevertheless contest their meaning. See Guzman, supra note 18, at 641 (discussing the
uncertainty and controversy surrounding expropriation, including the rise and fall of the Hull Rule); NAFTA,
supra note 16, at art. 1110. Meanwhile, other investment rights articulate more vague standards that can make
the precise scope of these rights more challenging to delineate. See Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable
Treatment: A Key Standard In Investment Treaties, 39 INT'L LAW 87, 87, 90-94 (2005) (explaining that it is
unclear "whether the requirement of fair and equitable treatment forms part of customary [international] law"
and acknowledging the challenge in delineating the scope of customary international law and fair and equitable
treatment); but see Revised U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5, Feb. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/29030.doc
(providing detailed definitions of the minimum
standard of treatment under international law).
22.
RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); Franck,
Legitimacy Crisis,supra note 1, at 1529-32; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 83-85; Giorgio Sacerdoti,
BilateralTreaties and MultilateralInstruments on Investment Protection, in RECUEIL DES COURS 265, 265-75,
299 (1997).
23. Investors are often granted higher security and better treatment than domestic investors participating
in the same market. Kenneth Vandevelde, The PoliticalEconomy of the BilateralInvestment Treaty, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Political Economy]. The Trade Promotion Authority Act
("TPA"), in contrast, suggests that foreign investors in the United States should not receive treatment more
favorable than that available under U.S. constitutional principles. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2002). Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, S. Rep. No. 107-139, at 15 (2d Sess. 2002) (suggesting that foreign
investors must not receive more favorable protection than U.S. investors under the U.S. Constitution); David A.
Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States - Chile Free Trade
Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 705-07 (2004) (discussing the objectives of the TPA and noting
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B.

ProceduralInvestment Rights

Investment treaties are not simply revolutionary because of the substantive
protections that they provide. The real innovation of BITs was the provision of
procedural rights that gave investors a mechanism to enforce the substantive
rights directly. 2' In other words, investors not only have rights, they also have an
agreed forum to redress alleged wrongs.25
In the past, when a government's violation of international law adversely
affected an investment, an investor's remedies were limited.26 Investors' remedies
tended to be limited to the following: (1) negotiating with the sovereign; (2) suing the
sovereign in the sovereign's own courts where defenses of sovereign immunity may
be readily available; (3) asking their home government to negotiate diplomatically on
their behalf; or (4) lobbying their home government to espouse a claim on their
behalf before the International Court of Justice. While some of these options may
have provided useful opportunities to solve disputes, they were often ineffectual and
investors were unable to redress their grievances satisfactorily. Moreover, even
when litigation was pursued on an investor's behalf by its home country, it was
uncertain whether the investor would receive the financial compensation for its
damages.29

In investment treaties, however, sovereigns offer investors the right to arbitrate
directly with them for a violation of the treaty. This permits investors to function in a
manner akin to a private attorney general by initiating adjudication to redress

Congress was concerned not to give foreign investors an expropriation right "that differs substantially from the
right to compensation for takings that U.S. citizens already enjoy").
24. In an effort to exercise their sovereign authority, many governments have preferred to "remain
judges in their own cases, interpreting and applying the rules of international law unilaterally." OMALU, supra
note 1, at 157-58.
25. This prevents the rights in investment treaties from being the equivalent of a legal fiction. See The
Western Maid v. Thompson, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (observing that "[l]egal obligations that
exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp"); see also Karl
N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (1931)
(observing that the fundamental quality of the law is not just the right but "what can be done: not only 'no
remedy, no right' but 'precisely as much right as remedy').
26. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries:
Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5-8 (2006)
(describing the traditional diplomatic protections available to foreign investors harmed by breaches of
international law); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 178-79.
27. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1536-38.
28. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655, 659 (1990) (noting that in the 1970s the
United Nations had identified 875 acts of government takings in sixty-two countries over a period of fourteen
years prior to the promulgation of BITs; in the United States, the Department of State was aware of 102 existing
investment disputes between U.S. nationals and foreign governments, but suggesting that there was no effective
protection for vindication of these rights).
29. Even if the claims were successful, the home government may elect not to transfer the damages to
the investor. Should a host government elect not to pay, the enforcement mechanism was the passing of a U.N.
Security Council Resolution. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis,supra note 1, at 1537.
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inappropriate government conduct. 30 By outsourcing the function to those with an
interest in the dispute, it also prevents home governments from having to distinguish
between appropriate and unmeritorious claims against host governments. Rather than
having to put faith in a political or diplomatic process, or simply do nothing,
investment treaties provide a reliable, neutral forum for investors to enforce the rules
of law articulated in a specific treaty.
Best yet, most investment treaties permit investors to have a degree of control
over which method of dispute resolution they ultimately elect.3 ' Some treaties permit
investors to litigate their claims or arbitrate their claims on an ad hoc basis under the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Rules or
before respected arbitral institutions, such as the International Chamber of
Commerce or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.32 While ad hoc arbitration
under the UNCITRAL Rules has been utilized, the most common form of dispute
resolution under investment treaties is to permit arbitration before the World Bank's
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").33
C. The Investment ArbitrationProcess
But what exactly is investment treaty arbitration? Typically, it begins with
some sort of governmental conduct that adversely affects a foreign investor's
investment. For example, this government conduct might involve the enactment
34
of a law that redenominates local currency, 34 the administrative revocation of a
30. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private
InternationalAntitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219 (2001); Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1,at
1538; but see Occidental Exploration & Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, [2005] EWCA Civ.
1116, IT 23-48, available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Ecuador-FinalCAJudgment.doc (suggesting that
the rights in investment treaties are owned by private, individual investors rather than being public rights
asserted by private individuals on the public's behalf).
31. While some treaties permit parties either to litigate their BIT claims before national courts or arbitral
tribunals, not all treaties do this. Instead, many treaties limit the acceptable dispute resolution mechanisms to
arbitral tribunals. Nevertheless, parties may still have an option to arbitrate before various international
institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or before
an ad hoc arbitral body organized under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Franck, Bright Future, supra note 1,
at 53-54; Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1,at 1541-43. There may also be opportunities, although not
necessarily mandatory, let alone strictly enforced, to engage in some form of amicable resolution. Christoph
Schreuer, Traveling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD
INVEST. & TRADE 231 (2004) [hereinafter Schreuer, Of Waiting Periods].
32. Franck, Bright Future, supra note 1,at 54; Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1541; Calvin
A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct Investment Through Bilateral and
MultilateralTreaties, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 49-57 (2005); see also J. Steven Jarreau, Anatomy of a BIT, 35
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429, 492 (2004) (discussing an investor's dispute resolution options under the

U.S.-Honduras BIT).
33. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1542 n.78. Although these mechanisms tend to focus on
arbitration as a mechanism of resolving treaty disputes, there are a variety of other options that may be usefully
employed in resolving treaty-based claims. Susan D. Franck, Reconsidering Dispute Resolution Options in
InternationalInvestment Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: IS THE REGIME THREATENED BY ITS
SUCCESS? (Karl P. Sauvant ed.) (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Franck, Dispute Resolution Options].
34. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12,

2005),

64-66, 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMSFinalAward. pdf.
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banking license,' the breach of a government privatization contract, 36 or the
failure to provide police protection after forcible seizure of an investment.37
If an investor is unable to resolve its dispute with a host government,38 the
investor typically initiates arbitration by picking one of the neutral arbitral
institutions listed in the investment treaty and submitting a Notice and Request for
Arbitration.39 An investor then selects one arbitrator, and the sovereign selects
another arbitrator. Thereafter, the parties typically select a third arbitrator who serves
as the chair.4' Next, the parties gather their evidence and present arguments (typically
in private), and the tribunal renders an award that is enforceable worldwide.'
III.

INVESTMENT TREATIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Governments, including the United States, have increasingly found themselves
subjected to claims under investment treaties. 2 Sometimes governments successfully
defend claims, but at other times they lose. 3 When governments promise investors

35. Genin v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (June 25, 2001), 316, 17 ICSID REV.-F.I.L.J.
395 (2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Genin-Award.pdf.
36. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Aug. 19, 2005), V 157, 190 at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf.
37. Wena Hotel Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Proceeding on the Merits (Dec. 8, 2000), I 89-92,
41 I.L.M. 896 (2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Wena-2000-Final.pdf.
38. Many BITs expressly have waiting periods that require investors to provide proper notice and wait a
finite period of time prior to initiating arbitration. Schreuer, Of Waiting Periods, supra note 31; Hamilton &
Rochwerger, supra note 32, at 49-50. For a variety of reasons, investors can experience difficulties in
negotiating with governments under these conditions. See Barton Legum, The Difficulties of Conciliation in
Investment Treaty Cases: A Comment on Professor Jack C. Coe's "Toward a Complementary Use of
Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes-A Preliminary Sketch ", 21(4) MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 23 (2006); see
also Franck, Dispute Resolution Options, supra note 33.
39. Franck, Bright Future, supra note 1, at 54. If, however, an investor can elect to arbitrate under the
UNCITRAL Rules, this will be an ad hoc arbitration that proceeds pursuant to those rules but without the
administrative oversight of an administrative institution.
40. Under the ICSID Convention, parties can agree on the appointment of the president of the tribunal.
Art. 37(2)(b) Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States of March 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1966) [hereinafter the ICSID Convention]. By contrast, under ad hoc
UNCITRAL arbitration, the party-appointed arbitrators agree on the appointment of the Chair. United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, Apr. 28, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976), art. 7(1)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules]. In another variation, a tribunal might be appointed by the ICC Court. See, e.g.,
Parra, Provisions, supra note 16, at 306-07, 326.
41. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1543-45.
42. Barton Legum, Investment Treaty Arbitration's Contribution to International Commercial
Arbitration, 60 Disp. RESOL. J. 71, 72 (2005) (suggesting that in early 2000, "the number of awards in
investment treaty cases could be measured on one hand. Today there seems to be a new award every week.").
43. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter ]] in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected
Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1459-60 (2003) [hereinafter Coe, Taking
Stock]; Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter
11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 366-67 (2003); see also Richard Newfarmer, Beyond Merchandise Trade:
Services, Investment, Intellectual Property and Labor Mobility, in GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 97, 107-08
(2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/gep2005.pdf (indicating
investors making claims under NAFTA have alleged over $1 trillion in damages but the total damages awarded
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substantive rights and a forum for vindicating violations of those rights, governments
create risks. Those risks relate to the waiver of sovereign immunity, litigation risk"
associated with the possible need to defend against investor claims, and the
possibility of ultimate liability. 5 The defense of a treaty claim may require
governments to spend millions of dollars. Nevertheless, expending financial
resources may be necessary (or at least economically efficient) since a single
government measure may lead to claims worth billions of dollars.46 Should an
investor be successful, a government may have to pay damages associated with the
claim, and it may be politically or economically expedient to defend the claimparticularly as awards within the past decade have ranged from approximately
$500,0O00 7 to $18 million 41 to $75 million 9 to $270 million."'

has been in the order of $35 million). The author is grateful to Mr. Devashish Krishan for bringing this
document to her attention.
44. For the purposes of this article, "litigation risk" refers to the possibility that a sovereign may be
subject to suit for conduct that allegedly violates an investment treaty. While not all investment treaties permit
litigation of a treaty-based claim, this concept refers to risk created from the creation of a dispute resolution
mechanism to resolve investors' claims through an adjudicative process.
45. See Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003, supra note 19, at 22 (outlining various political costs of
investment treaties); Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1592 (outlining potential financial costs); see
also Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 32, at 20-27 (suggesting a variety of costs related to signing
investment treaties).
46. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis,supra note 1, at 1512; see also Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World
Investment Court, AM. LAWYER (Summer 2004), available at http://www.americanlawyer.comlfocuseurope/
investmentcourt04.html (noting that the more than thirty claims brought by investors against Argentina relating
to the devaluation of the peso are easily worth $10 billion). Arguably, the risk of such claims being brought may
also serve to chill a state's legislative or regulatory authority. There is mixed anecdotal evidence on this point.
Compare Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA 's Investment Protectionsand
the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 133 (2003)
(suggesting cigarette manufacturers have used NAFIA to inhibit Canada from enacting antismoking legislation)
with Frank E. Loy, On A Collision Course? Two Potential Environmental Conflicts Between the U.S. and
Canada, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 11, 22 (2002) (noting that Canada did not believe NAFTA litigation had resulted in
a regulatory chill, but expressing skepticism that this was correct); Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by
NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004 at § 1 (providing an example of where government
actors were unaware that their normal activities could subject a government to liability). Interestingly, there is
some evidence of a reverse "litigation chill," where public outcry related to an investor's suit against a host
government may actually provide an incentive for investors to drop a case. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra
note 32, at 23 (noting that a foreign investor "eventually dropped the [ICSID] case against Guyana in light of
continued public opposition").
47. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award in Respect of Damages (May 31, 2002), at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Pope-Damages.pdf (holding Canada liable for $461,565).
48. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36
(2001), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf (holding Mexico liable for
$16,685,000).
49. Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award (July 1,
2004), at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/oxy-ecuadorfinalaward_001.pdf [hereinafter Occidental Award] (holding
Ecuador liable for damages for $75,074,929).
50. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003), at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-FinalOOI.pdf (awarding CME $269,814,000 in damages for breach of an
investment treaty). Similarly, in a decision rendered after the initial draft of this article, a tribunal found Argentina liable
in the order of $165,240,753 for breaching a BIT with the United States. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (July 16,2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf.

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 19
As the risk related to granting these rights becomes more quantifiable, which
highlights the significance of the risk, a movement has begun to assess the
significance of the benefit of investment treaties by considering whether investment
5
treaties actually achieve the desired objective of promoting foreign investment.
A. Anecdotal Evidence
While there is some empirical evidence suggesting that trade liberalization
improves investor confidence, 52 there is mixed anecdotal evidence that investment
treaties promote FDI. On one hand, investors such as Ronald Lauder have testified
before the U.S. Congress that the Czech Republic "went out of its way to encourage
U.S. investors... [and] they pointed out that such an investment would be protected
by the bilateral investment treaty between the United States and the Czech
Republic." When making his own investment in the Czech Republic, Mr. Lauder
explained he did so "with the knowledge that [the investment] was protected
unequivocally under the bilateral investment treaty."53 Other investors have
suggested that the existence of certain investment treaties reduce perceived political
risk 54 within a country; they may also have a signaling or reputation-building effect
for governments that enact the treaties. 5
On the other hand, some investors and commercial organizations are not even
aware of the existence of investment treaties. For example, in a 1999 survey related
to the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT"), 6 many chambers of commerce
51. See generally Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such a Bright Idea? at Exploring the IdeationalBasis
of Investment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195 (2005); see also Newfarmer, supra
note 43, at 107-08 (indicating that "the costs in the form of investor suits are nontrivial and growing" but
indicating the "legal and macroeconomic consequences of investment rights is largely unknown"); Franck,
Bright Future, supra note 1, at 49-51 nn.6 & 16 (referring to the debate as to whether BITs achieve their stated
goals).
52.

OMALU, supra note 1, at 219; see also THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 25

(Khosrow Fatmi & Dominick Salvatore eds., 1994) (referring to studies related to trade liberalization in
Mexico).
53. Treatment of U.S. Business in Eastern and CentralEurope, Subcommittee on EuropeanAffairs, Sen.
Comm. On Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., Send. Sess. at 18 (June 28, 2000) (Testimony of Ronald Lauder,
Chairman, Central European Media Enterprises).
54. One wonders whether actuaries share investors' perceived decrease in political risk when calculating
political risk insurance ("PRI") rates. Should they share this understanding, the decreased risk might reasonably
be expected to result in less expensive PRI, which presumably decreases the cost of foreign investment and
serves as an incentive for foreign investment. See UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 20, at 142
(suggesting that "BITs can facilitate the purchase of political risk insurance from public investment insurance
agencies and reduce premiums for this insurance"); see also Hamilton & Rochweger, supra note 32, at 31-33
(discussing a variety of entities providing political risk insurance). The author contacted the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), a U.S. entity which issues PRI, and they have not conducted any studies
examining whether BITs affect PRI rates. OPIC is unlikely to issue a political risk insurance policy unless the
country of investment has an investment treaty with the United States. See Comeaux & Kinsella, supra note 12,
at 37; 22 U.S.C.A. § 2197(a); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (suggesting the availability of
political risk insurance may influence an investment decision).
55. OMALU, supra note 1, at 225.
56. European Energy Charter Conference: Final Act, Energy Charter Treaty, Decisions and Energy
Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995), available at
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indicated that they had no familiarity with the investment treaty. 57 One secretary
general of an Australian chamber of commerce even went so far as to state, "I have
no knowledge of the ECT and doubt whether our members... would have much
knowledge either... I cannot answer your questionnaire and I doubt whether any of
the major Chambers of Commerce would be either able or interested either."58
Recognizing this gap in investors' knowledge-or perhaps the lack of appreciationof the potential power of investment treaties, lawyers looking to generate the
business
of investment treaty arbitration market it as "rights you never knew you
59
had.',
While investors may be aware of investment treaties, their existence may only
have a marginal impact on the decision to invest. In the context of the North America
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), for example, investors have suggested that the
treaty was not the cause of their investment and that, if anything, NAFTA marginally
influenced their decision to invest. Instead, these investors focus on the economic
liberalization and reforms that began in the 1980s as the primary factor driving their
investment determinations. 6°
There are, of course, limits to the generalizability of this anecdotal information.
First, it may be unrepresentative of investors' motivations. Sadly, there is little
empirical evidence to assess this issue and determine, in a valid and reliable manner,
what factors affect investment decisions. Second, the majority of this anecdotal
evidence relates to investor evaluations and decisionmaking in the 1990s. Given the
recent proliferation of investment treaty arbitration and the success of certain
investors in those arbitrations, one wonders whether FDI decisions today would be
influenced differently by the existence of an investment treaty and the availability of
investment treaty arbitration.
B. EmpiricalAnalyses
There is also emerging empirical literature that considers whether investment
treaties foster FDI.6' Unfortunately, this literature is inconclusive. Some analysts
http://www.encharter.org/upload/lIFreatyBook-en.pdf. It may be inappropriate to make many generalizations
about the ECT; although it is a multilateral treaty with a variety of signatories, the scope of its protections relate
to the energy sector. Id.
57. OMALU, supra note 1, at 205.
58. Id.
59. Allen & Overy, In Focus: The Rise of Investment Treaty Arbitration, http://www.allenovery.
com/asp/infocus.asp?pagelD=3837 (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
60. OMALU, supra note 1, at 221.
61. There is also literature that seeks to explain the proliferation of investment treaties during the last
fifty years. While this aspect of the literature is beyond the scope of this article, the phenomenon could be
explained in a variety of ways. For example, "learning theory" suggests that governments observe the outcome
of previous BIT signings and sign further BITs because BITs work. See generally Zachary Elkins & Beth
Simmons, On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. Soc.
SCI. 33, 42-43 (2005). Another explanation might be the presence of institutional copying, where governments
repeat the actions of others in an effort to appear enlightened or receptive to modem international law trends.
Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 117; Guzman, supra note 18, at 667. Yet another suggestion is that the proliferation
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suggest that the impact of investment treaties may be negligible. Instead, these
"market protagonists" find that other factors relating to the market for FDI are
61
likely to influence investment decisions. In contrast, another group of scholars
has a different perspective. These "treaty protagonists" have found that
investment treaties do attract FDI.63
1. Market Protagonists
Analysts from the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"), the World Bank, and elsewhere have conducted research
suggesting that investment treaties have a minimal impact on foreign
investment. 6' Nevertheless, to the extent that such treaties do impact investment
determinations, these studies suggest that they are one aspect of larger market
forces that impact FDI (e.g., the size of the internal market, the gross domestic
product ("GDP") of the host country, pre-existing levels of investment, and the
degree of market liberalization).
The UNCTAD studied these issues in the 1990s. While its studies provide a
weak indication that signing an investment treaty has a positive influence on
FDI,65 the UNCTAD study ultimately concluded that BITs play a "minor and
secondary role in influencing FDI flows." 66 Instead, UNCTAD's analysis
suggests that other factors, such as GDP, population, and levels of domestic
investment are more powerful determinants of FDI.67 Ultimately, investment
treaties may not cause investment, but they may be correlated with investment
levels. As UNCTAD cogently explained:
[I]t is generally recognized that investment decisions, and thus FDI
flows, are determined by a variety of economic, institutional and political
factors, including the size and growth rate of the host-country market, the

of BITs has been driven by competitive pressures between developing nations seeking to attract FDI. Guzman,
supra note 18, at 676; see also Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing For Capital:
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (forthcoming),
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1028&context=bple.
62. Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment?
Only a Bit-and They Could Bite (June 2003), http://econ.worldbank.org/files/29143-wps3121.pdf; see also M.
Sornarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79, 82 (1986)
(suggesting that "in reality attracting foreign investment depends more on the political and economic climate for
its existence rather than on the creation of a legal structure for its protection").
63. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at I11.
64. This research has tended to focus on bilateral agreements, or BITs, rather than evaluating the impact
of multilateral treaties.
65. UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 20, at 122. UNCTAD also indicated that there were
some foreign investors who encouraged their home governments to conclude BITs where they have existing
investments. This would suggest that BITs have the capacity-perhaps not to increase investment flows-but to
retain existing levels of foreign investment. Id. at 142.
66. Id. at 141-42.
67. Id. at 118-22.
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availability of raw materials or labour. It would therefore be
unreasonable to expect that any individual factor, let alone a BIT, could
be isolated and 'credited' with a decisive impact on the size or increase
of FDI flows. Even such important locational determinants as large and
growing markets, or oil deposits . . . do not work alone as FDI
determinants, but only in tandem with other factors.6 s
Mary Hallward-Dreimer, an economist at the World Bank, expresses further
skepticism about the impact investment treaties have on FDI. While she finds
only one "significant positive result that a BIT could increase FDI," 69 her results
generally suggest that the impact of investment treaties is not statistically
significant; instead, the size of a host country's market is a more conclusive
determinant of FDI flows.7 ° Hallward-Dreimer's analysis also suggests that
signing a treaty does not enhance property protections, and a "BIT has not acted
as a substitute for broader domestic reform. Rather, those countries that...
already have reasonably strong domestic institutions are most likely to gain from
ratifying a treaty." 7' These results suggest that, to the extent that investment
treaties act more as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, domestic
institutional reform, the real value from investment treaties may only come when
they are a signal of future institutional reforms and trade liberalization. 7 Thus,
trade liberalization or institutional reforms that precede or follow the signing of
an investment treaty likely are two factors that will affect investors' investment
decisions.
Jennifer Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman also conducted an econometric
analysis to isolate the influence that investment treaties have on FDI. Like
UNCTAD and Hallward-Dreimer, they find that population and market sizeand in some cases GDP-are the crucial variables influencing FDI.7 ' The general

68. Id. at 122.
69. Hallward-Driemier, supra note 62, at 20.
70. Id. at 18.
71. Id. at 22-23. But see UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 20, at 111 (finding that BITs
signed by African countries had more effect than BITs in other regions because BITs are likely more important
where the country is less developed).
72. Hallward-Driemier, supra note 62, at 16, 21-23; see also Vandevelde, PoliticalEconomy, supra note
23; Vandevelde, Economics, supra note 18, at 470 n. 10 (observing that investment treaties have the capacity to
signal a state's commitment to a liberal investment regime); DoLZER & STEVENS, supra note 22, at 12
(suggesting that BITs "send an important signal to the international business community to the effect that the
[state] not only welcomes foreign investment but will also facilitate and protect certain foreign ventures").
73. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003, supra note 19, at 19; see also Jennifer Tobin & Susan RoseAckerman, Foreign Direct Investment and Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of
BilateralInvestment Treaties, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 293 at 22-23, 30-31 (May 2, 2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=557121 [hereinafter Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005]. While revising this
article, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman produced new scholarship with different results. The new analysis suggests
BITs have a positive impact on FDI flows to developing countries but it is highly dependent on the political and
economic environment surrounding FDI and BITs. See Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs
Have Some Bite: The Political-EconomicEnvironment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, (Nov. 14, 2006),
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results of their analysis suggested that the relationship between investment
treaties and FDI is weak with little impact upon FDI. 4 In the specific context of
the effects of U.S. BITs, the data suggested that "signing a BIT with the United
States does not correspond to increased FDI inflows. 75
Closer analysis of the Tobin/Rose-Ackerman data reveal two interesting
findings related to perceived political risk and investment. First, where a country
exhibits high levels of political risk, there is a marginal benefit in signing a treaty
and, for particularly risky countries, BITs may actually have "a negative effect on
FDI inflows."' 6 Second, lower political risk may alleviate the potential adverse
effects BITs can have on FDI inflows; however, once a country achieves a
minimally low level of political risk, BITs may begin to become important in
attracting FDI.7
Ultimately, these findings suggest that investment treaties may be important
instruments, but the interaction between BITs, political risk, and investment
flows is complex. A BIT may be harmful in some circumstances, but in other
circumstances, it may have no effect or possibly provide a tipping point for FDI
decisions in risky countries where there is also some minimal level of political
stability."8 Ultimately, given the generally weak relationship between BITs and

http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/roseackermancv.htm (suggesting that "as the coverage of BITs increases,
overall FDI flows to developing countries may increase, but the marginal effect of a country's own BITs on its
FDI will fall" and observing that "a stronger political environment for investment and a better local economic
environment are complements to BITs"). This is an important shift and indicates this area will require careful
consideration in the future.
74. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003, supra note 19, at 31; Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supra note 73,
at 22-23, 30.
75. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003, supra note 19, at 22, 31; Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supra note
73, at 30-31.
76. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supra note 73, at 22. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman's original work
found "countries that are relatively risky seem to be able to attract somewhat more FDI by signing BITs. For
those that are relatively safe for investors the marginal effect of BITs is small." Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003,
supra note 19, at 31. In the later work, their general findings suggested that the negative effect on FDI flows can
grow smaller as a country becomes less risky. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supranote 73, at 22, 31.
77. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supra note 73, at 23, 30; Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003, supra note
19, at 27. In their earlier work, although there was a weak positive relationship between BITs and private
domestic investment, as political risk decreased, the number of BITs in force appeared to discourage domestic
investment. Id. at 27, 31. In their later work, however, it was unclear whether BITs generally discouraged FDI
flows. At high level of political risk, BITs could have a negative to neutral effect on FDI. At low levels of
political risk, the negative effect would decrease and the data began to suggest a BIT could at some point have a
positive effect. Because they found similar results both for their general data as well as data focused on U.S.
BITs, they suggested that some form of protection must be in place before BITs can begin to achieve their
desired result. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supra note 73, at 22-24, 30-31.
78. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 73, at 30. While there is not a traditional BIT between the
United States and Vietnam, the two countries entered into an investment agreement in 2001. See 66 FED. REG.
31375 (2001); 66 FED. REG. 65019 (2001); see also U.S. Department of State, 2005 Investment Climate
Statement-Vietnam (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd12005/42198.htm. Since then, U.S.
investment in Vietnam has increased to approximately $2.5 billion. U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE, DOING
BUSINESS IN VIETNAM: A COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES 64 (2004), available at
http://www.buyusa.gov/vietnam/en/country commercial-guide.html.
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investment, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman express skepticism as to whether
investment treaties in general fulfill their major objective of encouraging FDI.7 9
2.

Treaty Protagonists

In contrast, the analysis of other scholars suggests that investment treaties do
increase FDI. When looking at U.S, BITs, for example, Salacuse and Sullivan find
strong evidence for the conclusion that BITs foster FDI. s° Neumayer and Spess,8"
Swenson, and Egger and Pfaffermayr12 reach similar conclusions regarding other
BITs.
Salacuse and Sullivan find that, when developing countries sign investment
treaties with Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
countries, FDI is likely to increase; and the degree of this investment is likely to be
substantially larger if the OECD country is the United States. 3 The effect is even
larger when analyzing the FDI of those countries that had signed a U.S. BIT and
comparing them with nonsignatories.84
The preliminary findings of Neumayer and Spess suggest that developing85
countries that sign more BITs with developed countries receive more FDI flows.
Although they suggest that BITs may sometimes function as substitutes for
domestic institutional quality, they also note that the positive effect of BITs on

79.

Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003, supra note 19, at 31; Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supra note 73,

at 31.
80. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 109, 111. They conclude the following: (1) a "U.S. BIT is
more likely than not to exert a strong and positive role in promoting U.S. investment"; (2) a "U.S. BIT is more
likely than not to exert a strong and positive role in promoting overall investment"; and (3) a "U.S. BIT is likely
to exert more of an impact than other OECD BITs in promoting overall investment." Id. at I 1; see also
Guzman, supra note 18, at 680 (noting in an early analysis that "[w]ithout a BIT, a particular developing
country will have a much lower level of investment than otherwise"); but see Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005,
supra note 73, at 23, 30 (suggesting that Salacuse and Sullivan's methodology may employ too short a time lag,
omit certain variables, such as country-specific effects, and have skewed results as a result of the source of the
data).
81. Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment
in Developing Countries? (May 2005), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000627/0lfWorld-Dev
(BITs).pdf#search=%22washington%20spess%20foreign%20investment%20BIT%22].
82. See Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 131, 152-55 (2005) (finding signing BITs, particularly those with the United States, was positively
correlated with larger investment flows but acknowledging that these results may be influenced by other
variables such as alternative investment promotion measures); Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact
of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. EcON. 788 (2004) (reviewing
OECD data and finding investment treaties exert a significant positive effect on FDI, particularly if they are
implemented and noting that simply signing a treaty has positive-although less significant-effects on FDI).
83. Salacuse & Sullivan, supranote 17, at 106.
84. See id. at 109 (explaining that a U.S. BIT is correlated with a major FDI increase when compared to
those countries without a BIT and suggesting "a U.S. BIT is correlated with an extra $1 billion (approximately)
in increased FDI per year").
85. Neumayer & Spess, supra note 81, at 27. More specifically, countries with a higher cumulative
number of BITs, richer countries and fast-growing economies and larger populations receive more FDI, but
factors such as high inflation rates deter FDI. Id. at 21.
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FDI decreases as governments become more stable.86 Nevertheless, Neumayer
and Spess suggest that by "succumbing to the obligations of BITs," developing
nations will secure the "desired payoff of higher FDI inflows," specifically those
countries "with particularly poor institutional quality stand the most to gain from
BITs.""s Ultimately, they conclude that investment treaties "fulfill their purpose
and those developing countries that have signed more BITs with major capital
exporting developed countries are likely to have received more FDI in return."88
Analysts evaluating multilateral regional trade and investment agreements
similarly suggest that such treaties can positively impact foreign investment.
Lederman, Maloney, and Serven found that positive FDI flows are more likely
when regional treaties create larger markets; but they also discovered that,
despite NAFTA's initial positive influence on FDI, this increase is not sustained
over time.s9 Similarly, a World Bank analyst, who acknowledged the lack of
impact that BITs had on direct investment, nevertheless found that regional
agreements, which create larger markets, do encourage greater investment. 9°
C. Synthesis of the Literature
Given the mixed nature of the literature and scholars' different empirical
methodologies, it is difficult to draw decisive substantive conclusions. 9, A
synthesis of the existing literature might reasonably suggest that, while

86. Id. at 22-24. Commentators indicate Neumayer and Spess' data suggest that the "apparent boost
provided by a BIT is bigger in countries that were characterized by a greater risk, and hence likely to benefit
more from the decisions to sign a BIT." Swenson, supra note 82, at 135.
87. Neumayer & Spess, supra note 81, at 27.
88. Id. at 28. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman suggest that the difference between their results and the results
of Neumayer and Spess may be due to factors such as a difference in sample size, the extended time period of
the countries, and the countries focused on by the two studies. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2005, supra note 73, at
23.
89. Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney & Luis Serven, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and
the Caribbean Countries: A Summary of Research Findings (2004), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
geograph/north/lessonsNAFTAe.pdf.
90. Newfarmer, supra note 43, at 109; see also Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Emesto Stein & Christian Daude,
The FTAA and the Location of FDI (2004), available at http://www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc/
pdf/dtbc281.pdf (suggesting that regional trade agreements have a strong positive impact on inflows); Swenson,
supra note 82, at 153 (commenting on the effect regional agreements have on foreign investment). Newfarmer
acknowledges, however, that FDI is part of a larger complicated web related to GDP, political stability, inflation
rates, government effectiveness, and risks of expropriation. Newfarmer, supra note 43, at 109.
91. The different empirical analyses employ different methodologies to arrive at their results. HallwardDriemier, supra note 62, at 12 (analyzing country pairs and considering the bilateral flow of FDI from twenty
OECD countries to thirty-one developing countries from 1980 to 2000); Neumayer & Spess, supra note 81, at
15-21 (gathering data from 119 developing countries between 1970 and 2001, considering their FDI flowsrather than FDI inflows-as a percentage of host country GDP, evaluating the cumulative number of BITs
signed, and weighting FDI flows); Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 104-05 (analyzing the impact of U.S.
BITs on aggregate FDI inflows to 100 developing nations by measuring the percentage change in FDI inflows,
rather than absolute FDI flows); Tobin & Rose-Ackerman 2003, supra note 19, at 12 (analyzing FDI flows
between sixty-three countries from 1980 to 2000 and measuring FDI as "inflows to a particular country as a
percentage of world FDI inflows for that year").
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investment treaties may have a negligible impact on investment, they are
nevertheless part of a wider set of forces fostering FDI. 92 The nature of current
analysis also suggests that certain individual treaties, whether they are bilateral or
multilateral agreements or agreements with specific trading partners, may be
more likely than others to achieve the desired goal of promoting and retaining
foreign investment. Put another way, it is difficult to make generalizations about
the influence of investment treaties, particularly where some treaties appear to
play a role in increasing FDI to host countries while others may not. Ultimately,
this is still an area of important scholarly analysis, and future empirical
examination may shed more light on the intricate web of factors influencing
foreign investment decisions.
IV. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: PROMOTING

FDI?

Given that the terms of investment treaties are varied and that there is a
possible relationship between the existence of an investment treaty and FDI, it
may be useful to inquire as to whether the specific terms of investment treaties
affect FDI. Despite the unique innovation in offering investors a forum to remedy
their substantive claims, there has been little analysis of whether investment
arbitration specifically provides an incentive for foreign investment or otherwise
promotes the stability of an internal investment regime. This article considers that
issue on a preliminary and particular basis.
Why is it potentially important to focus on the impact of investment
arbitration on FDI? There has been some suggestion that dispute resolution
provisions are one of the strongest investor protections in investment treaties.93
The former U.S. Treasury Secretary, John Snow, has also suggested that focusing
"attention on a dispute resolution process [is] a way to facilitate foreign direct
94
investment.,

While scholars suggest that dispute-settlement procedures in treaties are
likely to influence investment behaviors, others suggest that it would be

92. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 4, at 177 (discussing the mixed evidence about
the link between treaties and investment and observing that "firms make their investment decisions based on an
assessment of opportunities as a package, and treaty protections alone will rarely be decisive. A BIT addresses
only one part of firms' investment equation, and so by itself is not enough to overcome problems with
infrastructure or other parts of the investment climate"); see also Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 115 (suggesting
that although "most think that the purpose of [investment treaties] is to attract investment, the best available
evidence suggest that BITs have either no effect or a minimal positive effect on investment flows").
93. See Newfarmer, supra note 43, at 107.
94. Khozem Merchant, Snow Callsfor an Arbitration System to Ease India Fears, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2005, available at http://news.ft.com/cms/s/d8lOddf8-5078-1 lda-bbd7-0000779e2340.html (on file with the
Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal); see also Express India, supra note 14
(suggesting that India drew FDI away from China by instituting effective ADR mechanisms and making India a
"hub of international arbitration"). Former Secretary of the Treasury John Snow's remarks involved installing
an arbitration system to reduce uncertainty in the timeframe for dispute resolution. Id. It is unclear whether the
comments were in the context of an international commercial arbitration system or an investment treaty related
dispute resolution mechanism. Currently, there is no BIT between the United States and India.
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challenging to isolate the effect of individual treaty rights, particularly the role of
dispute resolution mechanisms. 5 To date, there is an absence of empirical
evidence considering the relationship between investment arbitration and FDI,
and it appears that this evidence is not immediately forthcoming.
Accordingly, this section hypothesizes as to the potential role of dispute
resolution provisions in investment treaties, and considers both the direct and
indirect ways treaty arbitration might serve as an incentive for FDI. Part A looks
directly at the relationship between an investment treaty's dispute resolution
mechanism and foreign investment. It suggests several potential models to
explain the potential relationship between the dispute resolution mechanisms
contained in investment treaties and investment levels. Part B then evaluates how
investment treaty arbitration indirectly creates incentives for foreign investment
by fostering the development of the rule of law.
A.

Case Studies: Consideringthe Impact of Unique DisputeResolution
Provisionsto Evaluate Directly their Influence upon Investment Levels

Entrepreneurs and foreign investors may ultimately make investment
decisions based upon a variety of factors, 6 many of which are likely unrelated to
treaty dispute resolution mechanisms. While some businesspeople may perform
rational cost-benefit analyses prior to making their investments, other investors
may be more concerned with other factors, such as the following: (1) obtaining
immediate commercial profit,97 which might be implicated in a jurisdiction's tax
95. See Swenson, supra note 82, at 133-34; Neumayer & Spess, supra note 81, at 9-10; e-mail from
Jason Yackee to Susan Franck (Oct. 27, 2005) (on file with author) (suggesting that it might be "possible to
isolate the effects of various provisions, but only the "strongest" or most relevant provisions to investors");
Telephone Interview with Jason Yackee (Sept. 27, 2005) (suggesting that coding the impact of the dispute
resolution provisions of BITs is nearly impossible and isolating the effect of these provisions is a "hopeless
task" but suggesting that anecdotal evidence may be available). Jason Yackee, a Law Fellow at the University
of Southern California and a Ph.D. Candidate at University of North Carolina, is analyzing the impact of BITs.
Yackee has a grant from the National Science Foundation to conduct research related to why developing
countries sign BITs, which in many cases sacrifice attributes of national sovereignty in an attempt to attract
investment by multinational corporations.
96. See generally JEAN-FRANCOIS HENNART, A THEORY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 60-61, 88,
164-65, 166-71 (1982); HUGH SCHWARTZ, RATIONALITY GONE AWRY? DECISION MAKING INCONSISTENT WITH
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL THEORY (1998) (outlining behavioral considerations that appear relevant to
financial and economic decisionmaking); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance
Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't The Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1085-90 (2005)
(describing a variety of factors that influence investment decisions, including officers and directors concern
about retaining their jobs, maximizing their bonuses, keeping their companies competitive, avoiding shame and
embarrassment, and doing "what is right, what is professional, what is honorable, and what is profitable"); see
also Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-BorderTax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 79, 119 (2002) (suggesting that a "business decision to invest abroad generally seems motivated by
business and not taxes"); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairnessin International
Taxation: The Ability-To-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 305 n.10 (2001)
(gathering sources to suggest low foreign tax rates affect the investment location decisions of U.S. multinational
corporations).
97. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that investors are "[diriven by the
quest for profits"); see also ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (E. Cannon ed., 1937) (arguing people seek to
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regime or the stability of internal regulation; 9 (2) gaining a foothold in an
emerging market in the hopes of securing future profits; 99 (3) engaging in
institutional copying by entering a new market or seeking to gain a competitive
advantage over competitors in the same market;' ° (4) fostering existing

maximize their rational self-interest); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000)
(discussing the origins of rational choice theory suggesting that rational "actors will attempt to maximize their
financial well-being or monetary situation"); but see Elizabeth Asiedu, On the Determinants of Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Different?, 30 WORLD DEV. 107, 107, 114-16 (2001) (finding
that sub-Saharan Africa is different from other developing countries and FDI there is not responsive to greater
returns on investment and identifies other factors such as geographic location, the risk of government policy
reversal, and the sector-specific nature of the investment that are more likely to influence investment).
98. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 4, at 4-7, 22-4; see also supra note 97 and infra
notes 100, 121, 129 and 133 and accompanying text (discussing the role of taxes in foreign investment). But see
Peter K. Nyikuli, Unlocking Africa's Potential: Some FactorsAffecting Economic Development Investment in
Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 623 (1999) (failing to mention tax policy as a significant
factor affecting economic development in Africa); Dirk Willem te Velde, Policies Towards Foreign Direct
Investment in Developing Countries: Emerging Best-Practices and Outstanding Issues, 6-9 (Mar. 2001),
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/IEDG/Meetings/FDI Conference/DWPaper.pdf (concluding that the policies
adopted by developing countries affect FDI locational decisions only after a developing country has put in place
such fundamental factors as government stability, basic infrastructure, openness to trade, and sufficient market
size). While a thorough analysis of all factors affecting FDI decisions is beyond the scope of these remarks,
commercial profitability can also be affected by a variety of factors, such as the availability of skilled labor and
labor policies. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Investment and the
Relevance of the MultilateralInvestment Guarantee Scheme, 21 INT'L LAW. 671 (1987); THE DETERMINANTS
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE (United Nations 1992); see also John W. Budd
& Yijiang Wang, Labor Policy and Investment: Evidence From Canada,57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 386, 386,
398-99 (2004) (observing that regulatory policies, particularly those related to labor and employment, can
impact foreign direct investment); Farhad Noorbakhsh et al., Human Capital and FDI Flows to Developing
Countries: New Empirical Evidence, 29 WORLD DEV. 1593, 1593, 1602 (2001) (observing that the availability
of human capital is a significant factor in the locational decisions of multinational companies when investing
abroad and its importance has been increasing over time); George 0. White III, Foreigners at the Gate:
Sweeping Revolutionary Changes on the Central Kingdom's Landscape-Foreign Direct Investment
Regulations & Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the People's Republic of China, 3 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus.
95, 126-30 (2003) (suggesting culture and business relationships impact investment determinations).
99. See Andrea Ewart, CaribbeanSingle Market & Economy: What is it and Can it Deliver?, 11 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 39, 45 (2004) (observing "[o]ne common motive for foreign direct investment is to boost
local sales and market access"); MAURICE SHIFF & L. ALAN WINTERS, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 101, 117-19 (2003) (focusing on regional investment agreements and noting the importance of
market access); see also William B. Barker, Optimal InternationalTaxation and Tax Competition: Overcoming
the Contradictions,22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 161, 177-78 (2002) (explaining that in the past "one of the
primary reasons for FDI was market access" but suggesting that today tax incentives play a greater role); Dai
Yan, US$33.9 billion of FDI Settle in China in First Half Year, CHINA DAILY, July 13, 2004, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlenglish/doc/2004-07/13/content_348060.htm (suggesting that foreign investors
are drawn to China's "vast pool of cheap labour and its fast-growing market").
100. Barker, supra note 99, at 198; Been & Beauvais, supra note 46, at 31, 38-39; Coe, Taking Stock,
supra note 43, at 1439-40; see also Matthew C. Porterfield, InternationalExpropriationRules and Federalism,
23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 88 (2004) (suggesting that international investors may have a comparative advantage to
domestic investors who are in the same market); Mao-Chang Li, Legal Aspects of Labor Relations in China:
CriticalIssues ForInternationalInvestors, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 526 (1995) (observing foreign
investors can gain a comparative advantage by investing abroad and lowering opportunity costs); HELEN
HUGHES & YOU POH SENG, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN SINGAPORE 183-89 (observing
that foreign investors in Singapore claimed that a primary reason for their entry into the Singaporean market
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relationships with individuals or government;' ° ' and (5) taking into account the

sophistication and experience of investors and their attorneys. Given that
investment treaty arbitration may operate independently from or in conjunction
with these factors (or perhaps not at all), it seems appropriate to consider bases
for the assertion that investment arbitration may be an incentive for FDI as well
as counter-narratives.
Case studies provide useful models for directly evaluating what impact
investment treaty arbitration may have upon foreign investment decisions. While

many investment treaties provide arbitration as the exclusive final remedy for a
breach of treaty rights, 02 levels of FDI in those countries that have opted out of a
traditional arbitration model and have unique dispute resolution provisions
provide an opportunity to consider the relationship between dispute resolution
mechanisms and investment decisions.
This section therefore considers those countries that have signed investment
treaties with a limited or no right to investment arbitration. Likewise, there are

also countries that afford investors neither substantive nor procedural investment
rights. Nevertheless, in all of these situations, these countries experience high
levels of foreign investment. Theoretically, a variety of different models could
explain these results. Approaches might include a "place holding" model, a
"political and economic reality" model, and a "market liberalization" model. 03
1.

The PlaceHolding Model

In a "place holding" model, investors care less about the particulars of a
dispute resolution provision, and care more about establishing a place within a
market. China might be viewed as an example of this model.' 4 Historically,
was the comparative advantages of the host market).
101. See generally Bandell, supra note 11 (suggesting that political, social, and cultural relationships
between investors and host state entities are more reliable predictors of FDI than host-country characteristics);
Qiu, supra note 11 (discussing role of personal and institutional connections between foreign investors, Chinese
businesses, and the Chinese government in attracting FDI).
102. The precise number of investment treaties requiring mandatory arbitration of investment disputes is
not clear. See generally Parra, Provisions, supra note 16. The overriding theme appears to be mandatory
arbitration of claims, whether before ICSID, the SCC, the ICC, or under the UNCITRAL Rules. Nevertheless,
there are important variations. For example, many treaties require mandatory cooling-off or negotiation periods
before an investor can initiate arbitration. Id. at 332; Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1540 n.71;
Schreuer, Of Waiting Periods, supra note 31. While a few countries require investors to exhaust their local
remedies before initiating a treaty-based claim, many instead require the parties to choose between pursuing
claims before either the local courts or an international arbitration tribunal. Parra, Provisions,supra note 16, at
333-35.
103. This potential list of models is not exhaustive. It is possible that more than one model could
reasonably explain investment levels in a particular country. Establishing this nomenclature provides a
framework for the discussion and may tease out certain themes in the literature.
104. As with any of the proposed models, confirmation that this model applies to China would be best
done empirically on a treaty-by-treaty and country-by-country basis. Specifically, various countries have BITs
with China; tracking the specific levels of investment in China by country may be useful to indicate which BITs
have the greatest impact. This empirical analysis may suggest that this model will not work for all countries that
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China, had a series of BITs that offered substantive investment protections.
While some BITs did not offer foreign investors any forum to resolve their

disputes,' China often permitted Chinese courts to resolve investment disputes.
Specifically, although there was a narrow exception permitting arbitration for the
valuation of an expropriation claim, China required that all other substantive
claims be resolved before national courts.' °6
have BITs with China. For example, the United States, which has large levels of foreign investments in China,
does not have a BIT with China. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 110; see also U.S. Trade
Representative, China, at 1, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports _Publications/
2005/2005_NTE Report/asset upload file469_7460.pdf (stating that the "stock of U.S. foreign direct
investment (FDI) in China in 2003 was $11.9 billion, up from $10.5 billion in 2002"); K.C. Fung, Trade and
Investment among China, the United States and the Asia-Pacific Economies: An Invited Testimony to the U.S.
Congressional Commission 4 (Apr. 30, 2005), available at http://econ.ucsc.edu/faculty/workingpapers/tradeand
investment.pdf (indicating that the United States is the second largest foreign investor in China): Theodore W.
Kassinger, U.S.-China Trade: Opportunities and Challenges: Keynote Address, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
101, 102 (2005) (observing that "U.S.-China bilateral trade leapt to $231 billion" in 2004); ICSID, Bilateral
Investment Treaties: China, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/china.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006)
(failing to indicate that the United States and China have an investment treaty); UNCTAD, Investment
Instruments Online: Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006). Such a result would suggest that different models might reasonably explain the
presence of FDI within a single country. For example, the United States' experience in China might also be
explained by the place-holding model. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (describing a market
liberalization model); see also WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 4, at 7, 27, 57, 80 (observing that
China's economy has "grown impressively in recent years" and crediting this to the liberalization of the
investment climate, which includes providing private property rights and offering economic incentives for
business).
105. See Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments between the Government of the Kingdom
of Sweden and the People's Republic of China, July 1, 1979, arts. 6-7, available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/chinasweden.pdf (providing for arbitration of investment disputes between Sweden
and China and not other foreign investors, and at the same time, not prejudicing any rights to litigate claims
before national courts).
106. See Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and Government of the
Kingdom of Denmark Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 84 U.N.T.S.83
(No. 24573) (Dec. 4, 1986) art. 8, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china-denmark.
pdf (providing that if a dispute is not settled by negotiation, the dispute shall be "submit[ted] to the competent
court of the Contracting Party accepting the investment" but permitting "the amount of compensation resulting
from expropriation" to be determined through international arbitration); Agreement between the Government of
the People's Republic of China and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, June 4, 1984, art. 10, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/china belg-lux.pdf (indicating that investment disputes "shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the
State where the investment is located" but providing that the "amount of compensation for expropriation" to be
decided by an arbitral tribunal); Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of
the People's Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 185 U.N.T.S. 1994, June 27,
1994, art. 13, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china-newzealand.pdf (indicating
that investors may "submit the dispute to the competent court" but permitting "the amount of compensation for
expropriation" to be decided by an arbitral tribunal); Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Chile and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, Mar. 23, 1994, art. 9, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/diteliia/docs/bits/
chile-china.pdf (requiring disputes to be submitted to competent national courts, but permitting disputes related
to amount of compensation for expropriation to be arbitrated); see also Agreement between the Government of
Australia and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investments, July 11, 1998, art. XII, availableat http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docslbitsl
australia china.pdf (providing that investors can "initiate proceedings before its competent judicial or
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Reliance on national court systems and limited access to arbitration has not
stopped investors from making substantial investments in China. °7 This suggests
that irrespective of the procedural rights in investment treaties, there are some
markets where investors are keen to gain a place or a foothold in a developing
market. This "place holding" within a market is perhaps more important than the
procedural rights granted by investment treaties.
2.

The Politicaland Economic Reality Model

A "political and economic reality model" might suggest that when existing
economic and political relationships are sufficiently strong and stable, the
creation of a mechanism to resolve investment disputes is unnecessary.108
Australia is an example of this model. In particular, Australia and the United
States recently finalized a Free Trade Agreement (the "AUSFTA"), which
provides substantive investor rights but does not give investors any forum to
redress a treaty violation.' °9 Rather, Article 11.16 provides that the United States
and Australia will serve as "gate keepers""0 that will consult and decide whether
to permit an investor to arbitrate a treaty claim."'
administrative bodies" or arbitrate "where the parties agree or where the dispute relates to the amount of
compensation payable" for expropriation); Parra, Provisions, supra note 16, at 337 (observing how China
restricted the scope of arbitral investment disputes). China has recently shifted away from its traditional model,
where the second generation of BITs offered more comprehensive arbitration rights than before. See Agreement
between the People's Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Dec. 1, 2003, art. 9, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/chinagermany.pdf (providing that if disputes cannot be settled they shall be submitted for
arbitration); Agreement between the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the
Government of the People's Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
(Dec. 1991), art. 9, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech-china.pdf (providing
that investor-State disputes be resolved either by competent courts or ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration).
107. In the 1990s, "China was the most popular country in the world for foreign investment, aside from
the United States." Ted G. Telford & Heather A. Ures, The Role of Incentives on Foreign Direct Investment, 23
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 612 (2001); see also See United Nations, China FDIFact Sheet, (2005),
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditedir/docs/wir05 fs cn-en.pdf (providing empirical evidence
regarding the increase in FDI inflows to China between 1985 and 2004).
108. This model might also implicate the nature of the economic, political, and legal structures within
the signatory states. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (noting the evidence of strong economic and
political linkages between the United States and Australia).
109. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, (Mar. 3, 2004), art. 11, available at http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Australia-FrA/Final-Text/asset-uplo afile 148-5168.pdf [hereinafter
AUSFrA].
110. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1589-91 (describing the barrier building and gate
keeping approach to dispute resolution in investment treaties).
111. AUSFrA, supra note 109, at art. 11.16(1). The agreement does not, however, prevent bringing a
claim against a government if it is permitted under national law. Id. at art. 11.16(2). Australia has also signed an
investment agreement with New Zealand that does not provide a specific mechanism for investors to bring
investment related claims; instead, the two countries are required to negotiate the claims. See Australia New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement, art. 22, availableat http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new-zealand/
anzcer/anzcertal.pdf; see also http://www.fta.gov.au/default.aspx?FolderlD=292&ArticlelD=237; but see
Singapore Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 14, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/
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Trade and investment have flowed, and will probably continue to flow,
fluidly between these two countries." 2 One might speculate that the current
dispute resolution system exists because both countries have well-developed
rules of law and a reliable and independent court systems."3 But there might be
another explanation. A "political and economic reality" model might suggest that
two nations with shared economic and political goals, and substantial crossborder investment flows, recognize that they are both likely to be on the
receiving end of investor-State disputes." 4 This means that both countries have an
incentive to create a dispute resolution mechanism that creates barriers limiting
saftalfull-safta.pdf (providing for investor-State dispute resolution and permitting claims to be litigated or
arbitrated).
112. The United States Trade Representative has indicated that U.S. FDI in Australia in 2003 was US$41
billion, and that Australia is currently the fourteenth largest export market for U.S. goods. See United States Trade
Representative, Australia: Trade Summary, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports_
Publications/2005/2005_NTEReport/asset.upload-file243_7453.pdf; see also Statement of Ambassador Josette
Sheeran Shiner, infra note 113, at 2 (noting that the "[tiwo-way goods and services trade [between Australia and
the United States] is nearly $29 billion"). Similarly, analysis from the Australian government indicates that the
United States is the single largest investor in Australia, that U.S. FDI in Australia in 2004 was AUS$153 million
and Australian FDI in the United States during the same time was approximately AUS$140 billion. See
Government of Australia, Investment Australia, United States, http://www. investaustralia.gov.au/media/CFS_
UnitedStates.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) (setting out the levels of FDI between Australia and the United
States).
113. The Australian government has explained that there is no investor-State dispute settlement "[in
recognition of the Parties' open economic environments and shared legal traditions, and the confidence of
investors in the fairness and integrity of their respective legal systems." Australian Government Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement: Guide to the Agreement: 11, at 6.4
(Mar. 6, 2004), available at http://www.dfat.gov.aultrade/negotiations/us-fta/guide/ll.html; see also U.S.Australia Free TradeAgreement, Subcommittee on Trade, H.R. Committee on Ways and Means at 1 (June 16,
2004) (Testimony of Ambassador Josette Sheeran Shiner, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_.Library/USTRDeputy-Testimony/2004/assetupload file753_4363.pdf
(indicating that the United States and Australia "have long had a special partnership," common history, and "an
unwavering belief in freedom, democracy and the rule of law").
114. Prior to the enactment of NAFTA, the United States and Canada had a free trade agreement which
did offer rights, such as national treatment for investments, but did not permit investor-State dispute resolution.
Canada-United States: Free Trade Agreement, arts. 105, 1801-08, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1989). After the enactment of
NAFTA, however, both the United States and Canada have found themselves on the receiving end of
investment arbitrations. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 43, at 1459-60 (providing a table of the outcomes of
select arbitration cases under NAFIA, including the number of settlements, amounts claimed, amounts
recovered, and costs awarded); see also Todd Weiler, NAFTA Claims: Canada, http://www.naftaclaims.
corndisputes-canada.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006) (listing claims against Canada); Todd Weiler, NAFI'A
Claims: United States, http://www.naftaclaims.comdisputes-us.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006) (listing claims
against the United States). As this may be due to the large investment flows between the United States and
Canada, presumably the United States was sensitive to this issue when drafting the United States-Australia Free
Trade Agreement. U.S. Trade Representative, Canada, http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/canusa/ustrtrade estimates_2005.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) (observing that the "stock of U.S. foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Canada in 2Q03 was $192.4 billion, up from $170.2 billion in 2002"); U.S. Department of
State, 2001 Country Reports on Economic Practices and Trade Policy, 2 (Feb. 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8197.pdf (observing that in 2000, U.S. FDI in Canada amounted
to $126.4 billion, and Canada's FDI levels in the United States amounted to $103.7 billion); Aldo Forgione,
Weaving the Continental Web: Exploring Free Trade, Taxation, and the Internet, 9 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 513,
547 (2003) (observing that the "United States has always accounted for a substantial amount of foreign
investment in Canada"); see also Dodge, supra note 26, at 24 (observing the significant and reciprocal
investment flows between the United States and Australia, and commenting that "allowing direct claims under
AUSFTA would inevitably have led to a repetition of the Canadian and U.S. experience under NAFlA").
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the potential number of claims. While the Australian approach does not prohibit
investors from having a cognizable treaty claim, it does leave discretion to grant
a forum in the hands of two governments, which suggests that the substantive
rights are legal phantoms." 5 Rather than granting control to investors, it moves
the resolution
of treaty claims into a larger economic, political, and diplomatic
' 6
dialogue.

As the AUSFTA entered into force in January 2005,"' it is not clear whether
the dispute resolution mechanism in that treaty has impacted either United States
investment in Australia or vice versa. The treaty and its effects are, however,
worthy of ongoing consideration particularly as other countries may wish to
adopt the model.
3.

The Market LiberalizationModel

In a "market liberalization"" 8 model, modernization and liberalization of an
investment regime facilitates FDI irrespective of the existence of substantive or
procedural rights in BITs. Brazil " 9 and Ireland'2 ° might reasonably be viewed as

115. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (suggesting that the provisions of legal rights without
remedies create ghostlike legal obligations). Nevertheless, the AUSFTA has gone to the trouble to articulate
specific substantive rights that, arguably, must be given some meaning. If they were not meant to have an effect,
presumably they would not have been included.
116. Presumably investors are still free to bring claims arising out of domestic law before the domestic
courts. AUSFTA, supra note 109, at art. 11.16. The same cannot be said, however, of international law claims
arising under the treaty. See Dodge, supra note 26, at 2-4, 24-26 (indicating that claims under the AUSFTA
cannot be brought before local courts but can only be resolved under the State-to-State dispute resolution
mechanisms).
117. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-United States Free
Trade Agreement, January 1, 2005, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us.html; John R.
Crook, ed., United States, Australia Settle Disputes Blocking U.S. -AustralianFree Trade Agreement, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L.260, 260 (2005).

118. Whereas modernization refers to updating commercial laws, liberalization refers to the opening up
of markets, permitting public participation in areas previously relegated to the government, and fostering
competition. Market liberalization might be marked by a variety of different factors. For example, it might
include the creation of new trade rules to build a larger market, relaxing restrictions on industry to permit and
enhance market access, enhancing regulatory transparency, and creating incentives for competition. See
generally, Newfarmer, supra note 43, at 105- 06; Frank Barry et al., The Single Market, the StructuralFunds,
and Ireland's Recent Economic Growth, 39 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 537, 537-38 (2001); John Kelly &
Mary Everett, Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth in Ireland (Autumn 2004), available at
http://www.centralbank.ie/data/QrtBuIlFiles/2004%2003%2OFinancial%2OLiberalisation%20and%2OEconomic
%20Growth.pdf; NINA PAVCNIK ET AL., TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET ADJUSTMENT IN BRAZIL
7 (2003), available at http://wdsbeta.worldbank.orglexternal/ldefault/WDSContentServerlIW3P/IB/2003/03/29/
000094946_03031804031942/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. But see Asiedu, supra note 97, at 115 (suggesting
that trade liberalization in Africa is less effective in promoting FDI unless it is consistent with macroeconomic
equilibrium).
119. See Charles W. Cookson, Long-Term Direct Investment in Brazil, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
345, 356-58 (2004) (suggesting that the implementation confidence building actions, continuity of sound fiscal
and monetary policies, and the avoidance of politically expedient solutions are likely to spur economic growth
and employment, but noting that the interest rates of the Central Bank plays a critical role in the decision to
invest in Brazil); see also WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 4, at 122 (observing that Brazil's
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examples of this model. Both countries have modernized and liberalized their
economies during the past two decades. For example, Brazil has privatized
businesses to foster competition.'2 ' The degree of foreign investment in both
countries is tremendous'22 and is linked to their respective domestic economic
success.'23 Nevertheless, in comparison to the rest of the world, they have a very
small number of BITs in force. Specifically, Brazil has signed a handful of
BITs' 24 but has not ratified a single one,'25 while Ireland has only one BIT in
improved corporate governance in its stock markets has improved and has resulted in economic benefits); Scott
Appleton, Brazil: A Giant Awoken, 59 INT'L BAR NEWS 19, 19-20 (Dec. 2005) (describing Brazil's "enviable
position" that is caused by the "relative stability of the government and economic policies" and discussing new
legislation designed to encourage continued investment).
120. See generally KIRBY, supra note 9; IRYNA PIONTKIVSKA & EDILBERTO L. SEGURA, THE KEY
DETERMINANTS OF IRELAND'S ECONOMIC SUCCESS (The Bleyzer Foundation June 2004), available at
http://sigmableyzer.com/files/reland-A4-ENG.pdf; see also Dermott McCann, Small States in Globalizing
Markets: The End of National Economic Sovereignty?, 34 N.Y.U. J INT'L L. & POL. 281, 296 (2001) (observing
that Ireland's economic liberalization, which includes "a consistent strategy of removing restrictions on the
financial freedom of foreign investors, lightening their tax load, [and] deregulating the labor market," has
created a surge in foreign investment that is linked to an increase in Ireland's GDP).
121. Cookson, supra note 119, at 347, 361-62 (2004); see also Appleton, supra note 119, at 20
(discussing "public-private partnership legislation intended to pave the way for private investment in [Brazil's]
overstretched infrastructure"); Raul Gouvea, Challenges Facing Foreign Investors in Brazil: A Risk Analysis,
PROBS. & PERSPS. IN MGMT., 63, 65 (2004) (pointing to market reforms and privatizations of the 1990s as
factors that increased the efficiency and diversity of Brazilian industries and products); WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2001, supra note 4, at 237 (referencing a 1999 agreement between Brazil and the United States about
the enforcement of competition laws).
122. The aggregate level of FDI in Brazil has been on the increase since 1995. Cookson, supra note 119,
at 347. In 2000, Brazil had approximately $34 billion in FDI and was the region's largest recipient of foreign
investment. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, supra note 4, at 29, 64. Ireland has experienced similar
economic success. See also U.S. Department of State, 2005 Investment Climate Statement: Ireland, http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/42063.htm (on file with the Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law
Journal)(indicating that U.S. FDI in Ireland in 2003 exceeded $9 billion, an amount two and a half times the
amount of U.S. FDI in China).
123. Telford & Ures, supra note 107, at 609-10 (describing the dramatic economic growth of Ireland
and noting its shift from being labeled as a "developmental" failure in the 1980s and early 1990s to "Celtic
Tiger" phenomenon by the year 2000, which led "to truly remarkable economic growth"); Benjamin Powell,
Economic Freedom and Growth: The Case of the Celtic Tiger, 22 CATO J. 431 (discussing various possible
causes of the "dramatic economic growth" in Ireland during the 1990s); Beth Knight, Brazilian Auto Industry
and the Role of Government Intervention and InternationalAgreements in its Progress Through the 1990s, 14
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 311 (2004) (noting that "Brazil has seen a number of changes in the
last fifty years: growth in industrialization, increased privatization, and an opening of their markets to greater
foreign investment").
124. Brazil has BITs with Chile, Finland, Netherlands, Venezuela, Cuba, Denmark, Korea and Portugal.
See UNCTAD, Investment Treaties Online: Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.unctadxi._org/templates/
DocSearch.aspx?id=779 (last visited Dec. 21, 2006). The treaties typically grant investors the right to arbitrate
their investment treaty claims. See Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
between the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the Federative Republic of Brazil, Nov. 25, 1998, art. 9,
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands brazil.pdf (permitting investors to
litigate their claims before national courts, arbitrate at ICSID or arbitrate on an ad hoc basis under UNCITRAL
Rules); see also Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 28, 1995, art. 9, available
at http://www.unctad.orglsectionslditeliiadocsbitsfinland-brazil.pdf (same). Nevertheless, these provisions do
not appear to be in force. ICSID, BilateralInvestment Treaties: Brazil (2004), available at http://www.world
bank.org/icsid/treaties/brazil.htm (suggesting that Brazil has only ten bilateral investment treaties that have not
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force. 26 These two countries reflect a phenomenon that UNCTAD observed,
namely that BITs may be unrelated to the amount of FDI.'27 One might
reasonably suggest that the economic success, irrespective of the existence of a
BIT, reflects a model of market liberalization. In this scenario, internal domestic
efforts to liberalize markets,' 28 offer inducements for investment,'2 9 follow the rule
of law, 3"° and offer reliable dispute resolution"' provide the critical incentives
entered into force); see also U.S. Department of State, Brazil: 2005 Investment Climate Statement,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/41988.htm [hereinafter Brazil Investment Climate Statement] (last visited
Feb. 6, 2006) (on file with the Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal)(indicating that
Brazil has fourteen BITs, but none with the United States); UNCTAD, Total Number of Bilateral Investment
Agreements Concluded, 1 June 2005, http://www.unctad.orglsections/dite-pcbb/docs/ brazil.pdf [hereinafter
UNCTAD and Brazil BITs] (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) (indicating that Brazil has fourteen BITs with other
nations).
125. Bemardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: A
New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other JurisdictionalIssues, 59 JUL. DIsP. RESOL. J. 78, 81 (2004); Carlos
G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of
Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'LL. 301, 314 (2004).
126. Franck, Bright Future, supra note 1, at 50; Agreement between the Czech Republic and Ireland for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, June 28, 1996, art. 8, available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech-ireland.pdf (permitting investors to bring their investment disputes
before ICSID or on an ad hoc basis pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules); see also Department of Foreign Affairs,
Irish Treaty Series: Treaty Series 2001, http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/treaties/irish-treaty-series-database.asp?yy=
2001 &dd=2000 (on file with the Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal) (describing
Ireland's entry into the multilateral investment treaty, the Energy Charter Treaty).
127. See also Policy Implications, supra note 1,at 141 (indicating that there are "many examples of
countries with large FDI inflows and few, if any, BITS").
128. Cremades, supra note 125, at 81 (suggesting that "tax and other incentives have encouraged the
growth of investment in Brazil").
129. See generally Telford & Ures, supra note 107, at 607-09 (focusing on the role of government
incentives to make locations attractive for foreign investment).
130. Brazil, for example, has a form of social democracy. Cookson, supra note 119, at 348, 350-52.
Nevertheless, Brazil's adherence to the rule of law has been less consistent. See generally Peter Fry, Colorand

the Rule of Law in Brazil, in THE

(UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA

186 (Juan E.

Mdndez, Guillermo O'Donnell, & Paulo Sdrgio Pinheiro eds., 1999); Public Broadcasting System,
Commanding Heights: Brazil Rule of Law, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheightslo/countries/brlbr
_rule.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) (making observations about the development of Brazil's rule of law and its
inconsistent approach and difficulties investigating corruption charges); Lisa Valenta, Disconnect: The 1988
Brazilian Constitution, Customary InternationalLaw, and Indigenous Land Rights in Northern Brazil, 38 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 643, 649 (2003) (discussing problems with the rule of law related to threats to government officials).
Brazil, however, has made efforts to strengthen this variable and to provide dependable legal protection. See
Stephen Meili, Cause Lawyers and Social Movements: A Comparative Perspective on Democratic Change in
Argentina and Brazil, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
487, 501 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (observing that the personal motivations of lawyers in
Brazil "seem to fall into two discrete categories: a very personal and frequently moral desire to fight injustice,
and a more public sense of their individual role in the transition to democracy; that is, a transition that includes
adherence to the rule of law"); see also Statement by Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg Permanent
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations Security Council, Justice and the Rule of Law: the UN Role, Oct.
6, 2004, available at http://www.un.int/brazillspeech/004d-rms-csnu-Justice%20and%20the%2ORule%20of%
20Law-0610.htm (observing that Brazil has the "responsibility to instill, uphold and restore greater respect for
the rule of law not only at home but also throughout the world"); WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND
DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW 90-120 (2000)
(discussing problems with the Brazilian court system and its lack of administrative infrastructure and discussing
methods used to improve case management); Brazil Investment Climate Statement, supra note 124 (referring to
Brazil's judicial reforms of December 2005).
131. While Brazil has other forms of nontraditional dispute resolution, there is a "long-standing Brazilian
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necessary to spur foreign investment. Rather than the existence of a BIT or the
right to arbitrate treaty claims, governmental liberalization measures impact
foreign investment decisions.'32 Presumably these good governance measures
decrease investment risk and can lead to positive development outcomes.'33
Perhaps this is why France, which is Brazil's fourth largest investor, continues to
recommend 134that Brazil promulgate clear and stable rules to foster foreign
investment.
4. PreliminarySynthesis

Ultimately, one wonders whether investment treaty arbitration has a specific
role to play in fostering foreign investment. Perhaps private dispute resolution
provisions created by the parties, for use in enforcing specific negotiated
commercial contracts, are a more direct, effective, and reliable manner of
controlling investment-related risk. 135 Lest this sound like a message of gloom
and doom for investment arbitration, one must remember both that investment
arbitration is a relatively new process that has only been tested thoroughly within
the last decade, 36 and that treaty remedies may begin to take on an enhanced role
in investment decisions as more investors recognize the power of their treaty
remedies.

adage that one should do everything possible for one's friends, nothing at all for those who are neither friends nor
enemies, and apply the law to one's enemies." Cookson, supra note 119, at 351. There have already been significant
judicial reforms in Brazil, including reductions in red tape and reform of commercial and intellectual property law;
continued judicial reform is considered crucial in Brazil because the lack of the rule
of law as seen as an element in
attracting FDI. Id. at 358; see also Brazil Investment Climate Statement, supra note 124 (noting that Brazil's reforms
have created "binding precedent, [that] should, over time, make judicial decisions more predictable").
132. It is by no means a straightforward task to assign the relative importance of those market liberalizing
factors. Economists and political scientists will likely continue this debate. See Anjo Abelaira, Ireland's Economic
Miracle: What is "The Celtic Tiger"? (2004), availableat httpJ/www.celtia.info/culture/ economy/celtictiger.html (on
file with the PacificMcGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal)(describing transformation from one of
the poorest countries to one of the wealthiest countries in Western Europe and crediting such factors as foreign
investment, deregulation, competition, low levels of tax, and a qualified workforce; but noting that the debate about the
relative importance of these factors).
133. See Daniel Kaufman et al., World Bank Institute Policy Research Working Paper 2196: Governance
Matters 1, 15 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/pdf/govmatrs.pdf (suggesting that there
is a strong causal relationship between better governance, including adherence to the rule of law, and better
development outcomes); Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters: From Measurement to Action, FIN. &
DEVELOPMENT 10, 12 (June 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/ 06/pdf/kauf.pdf
(noting the strong link between strong adherence to the rule
of law and high per capita incomes).
134. Cookson, supra note 119, at 361 n.68; UNCTAD and Brazil BITs, supranote 124.
135. Francis Delacey, Enforcing Contracts in Developing Countries, in LAW INTRANSITION, supra note 1,at
20-22 (suggesting that "[miarket-friendly laws and an independent, competent judiciary to implement them have long
been credited for fostering economic and industrial development"; noting that "contract enforcement mechanisms,
whether formal or informal, are critical to commercial exchange"; and suggesting that judicial reform projects can
"enhance contract enforceability by ensuring that impartial and predictable judgments are issued" but that "endorsing
the use of arbitration" is likely to enhance contract enforceability).
136. Policy Implications, supra note 1,at 12 (providing a chart that suggests a surge in the number of
investment treaty cases since the late 1990s).
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B. Investment Treaty Arbitration:Indirectly FacilitatingFDIby Promulgating
the Rule of Law?
A larger question is whether investment treaty arbitration fosters the rule of
law and provides incentives to foster fair and legitimate decisionmaking in
national institutions. Arguably the availability of treaty arbitration can indirectly
facilitate investment by providing adjudicative independence and/or a model for
national courts to follow the rule of law. While speculative, a debate is emerging

about whether investment treaty arbitration creates an enclave that prevents
domestic development of the rule of law. This section surveys the literature on
this topic, and suggests that while these concerns about the elimination of the rule
of law should be considered and evaluated empirically, it is not clear that
investment treaty arbitration adversely
affects the rule of law and/or adversely
37
affects the incentive to invest.
Literature has emerged that argues the availability of investment treaty
arbitration adversely affects the rule of law in developing countries. These
commentators suggest that the existence of international dispute resolution for
foreign investment inhibits the development of the rule of law in national courts

by creating a regime that provides a privilege
to foreign investors and removes
38
investment disputes from local courts.

137. Ginsburg suggests that "[g]iven low observed levels of judicial independence in courts and many
developing countries and an information problem regarding foreigners' ability to observe the quality of such
courts, third party dispute resolution seems to facilitate investment. It apparently substitutes for poor
institutional environments." Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 113. He does not specify whether this reference to
third-party dispute resolution refers to international commercial arbitration on the basis of a private contractual
relationship or investment treaty arbitration originating under the treaty, but it appears he is referring to
investment treaty arbitration. See id. at I I, 113. This is a critical distinction as the two processes redress
different rights, have different public implications, and can be administered or enforced in different manners.
Parties can generally arbitrate distinct types of investor-State disputes at ICSID: (1) disputes where a sovereign
and an investor consent in a commercial agreement to arbitrate their commercial disputes at ICSID; or (2)
disputes where a sovereign has unilaterally consented to arbitrate treaty-based claims, and the investor accepts
the offer by initiating arbitration. ICSID Convention, supra note 40. See generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER,
THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001) [hereinafter SCHREUER, CONVENTION]; see also Franck,
Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1, at 1543, 1547 (explaining ICSID arbitration can be based upon consent to
arbitrate in an arbitration agreement but noting the limitations of ICSID arbitration).
138. See Mark Halle & Luke Eric Peterson, Investment Provisions in Free Trade Agreements and
Investment Treaties: Opportunities and Threats for Developing Countries, Dec. 2005, at 23-24, available at
http://www.undprcc.lk/web-trade/publications/BIT-completed.pdf [hereinafter Opportunities and Threats]
(observing that investment treaties "remove significant disputes between foreign investors and [g]overnment
agencies from the purview of local courts and tribunals ... [while relegating] locals-including domestic
businesses, who may be the lifeblood of domestic investment-to the mercies of these inadequate institutions").
But see Franck, Bright Future, supra note 1, at 62 (suggesting that domestic investors, if they structure their
investment through a foreign investment vehicle, may also be able to benefit from the rights provided to other
investors); Tokios Tokel s v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/l 8, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 29, 2004), 20
ICSLD REV.-F.I.L.J. 205 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsidlcases/tokios-decision.pdf
(holding that a local Ukrainian company that had reincorporated itself in Lithuania could qualify as a foreign
investor and benefit from the protections afforded by the Ukraine/Lithuania investment treaty).
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Professor Tom Ginsburg suggests that the "impact of BITs on subsequent
governance is ambiguous," and "under some circumstances BITs may lead to
lower institutional quality in subsequent years."' 3 9 Indeed, Professor Ginsburg
suggests that the "decision to bypass domestic courts may reduce courts'
incentives to improve performance by depriving key actors from a need to invest
in institutional improvement,"',
Commentators from the International Institute for Sustainable Development
("IISD"), a Canadian nongovernmental organization, echo these concerns. 4' IISD
suggests that investment treaties provide foreign investors with an "escape
clause," which might reduce the push for broader improvement
of domestic
4 2
institutions and instead insulate domestic legal institutions.'
Others go even further. In a working paper, Professor Ron Daniels suggests
that investment treaties have "subverted the evolution of robust rule of law
institutions in the development world. .. [because] foreign investors rationally
refrain from championing good and generalized rule of law reforms in the
developing state, preferring instead to protect their interests by relying on the
BIT rule of law enclave.' 43 He then suggests that BITs "enfeeble host state
governments, and, in sharp contrast to the claims made by supporters of the BIT,
will end up discrediting the normative legitimacy of the BIT as a rule of law
demonstration project."'"
These assertions overlook several vital matters, which suggest that
investment treaty arbitration may actually benefit the rule of law, or at 4a5
minimum, do not adversely affect a country's adherence to the rule of law.
Overvaluing and isolating investment treaty arbitration, while simultaneously

139. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 122.
140. Id. at 119, 122.
141. Opportunities and Threats, supra note 138, at 24 (referring to Professor Ginsburg's work that
suggests treaties can reduce local institutional quality).
142. Id.
143. See Ronald J. Daniels, Defecting on Development: Bilateral Investment Treaties and the
Subversion of the Rule of Law in the Developing World 2 (Draft Mar. 23, 2004), http://www.unisi.it/
lawandeconomics/stile2004/daniels.pdf (suggesting that a BIT is a "stand alone enclave in which foreign
investors can be largely insulated from the legal and political risks of contracting in the home state and relying
on its institution ... [but such reliance] dulls any interest or incentive on the part of foreign investors to seek to
condition their investments in the host developing state on the creation of good rule of law institutions that
would be generally accessible to foreign and domestic investors alike"); id. at 25 (arguing the "BIT enclave
enables foreign investors to exist from [the] domestic legal regime and this, in turn, implies a withdrawal from
the domestic debate over the need for, and the character of, good laws and legal institutions").
144. Id. at 30. One might suggest that because BITs' elimination of the customary international law rule
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies before bringing an international claim also undermines the rule of
law. Presumably, if foreign investors were required to litigate disputes through domestic courts rather than
directly taking their claims to international arbitration, this might build the capacity of local courts by the
following: (1) providing domestic courts with an opportunity to articulate relevant principles of domestic law;
(2) increasing the transparency of the system; and (3) giving notice to future investors of the relevant domestic
legal standards and their application. The author is grateful to Matthew Porterfield for his thoughts on this point.
145. Another explanation might be that other commentators use the concept of the "rule of law" in a
different manner than as used in the context of this article.
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undervaluing the role of national courts and ignoring the critical role of party
control, overlooks the symbiotic relationship between treaty arbitration and court
litigation in promoting the rule of law.
1. Investment Treaty Arbitrationas a Complement to Domestic Courts
Analysis from the World Bank suggests that investment treaty arbitration is
not a substitute for local institutions; rather, it can provide a complement to
domestic institutional reform. Hallward-Dreiemer's analysis suggests that BITs
are more, rather than less, effective in promoting higher institutional quality,
particularly where strong institutions already exist. '46 Especially where
investment treaties are used to signal the desire to engage in institutional reform
and adhere to the rule of law, offering the opportunity to arbitrate investment
claims might reasonably create a "race to the top" to adjudicate disputes
impartially and fairly, instead of a "race to the bottom."'' 47 In this manner,
investment arbitration has the capacity to fuel domestic support for the rule of
law because it will instill an "incipient belief in the capacity of institutions to
administer justice impartially." 8 Particularly for those BITs that permit investors
to choose between arbitration and court litigation, one might even wonder

146. Hallward-Driemier, supra note 62, at 21. But see Neumayer & Spess, supra note 81, at 5
(suggesting that, in contrast to Hallward-Driemier, their results "provide some limited evidence that BITs might
function as substitutes for poor institutional quality, which would suggest that they are most effective where
quality is low, and that they are most successful where they are needed most" but acknowledging that these
results are not "robust").
147. See Patricia Shaughnessy, Promoting Effective Arbitration through Legal Assistance Programmes,
22 ARB. INT'L 315, 318 (2006) (suggesting in the context of international commercial arbitration that the
development of arbitration "is not necessarily the result of ineffective or corrupt courts and it is not a
condemnation of a court system . . . [rather a] developed arbitration system is a natural component of a legal
system which respects contractual and legal rights"). The challenge, however, is that the investment treaty
arbitration may not be an appropriate example of a rule of law, particularly where tribunals articulate vague and
contradictory decisions on basic points of law. See generally Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 1.
Nevertheless, to the extent that arbitrators and commentators develop a reliable, consistent, and reasoned
doctrine, this model could encourage adherence to the rule of law by domestic courts. See generally Franck,
Bright Future, supra note 1.
148. Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in International Contracts and Its Relation to
Economic Regulation and Development, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 651 (2001); see also e-mail from
Professor Thomas Walde to OGEMID (Nov. 23, 2005) (discussing a meeting between UNCTAD and GTZ, the
Germany Technical Assistance Agency, which suggested that "the example of successful (impartial,
technically-competent) [international] dispute settlement [in BITs] will feed back into the domestic process, by
way of signaling good governance, example and pressure by domestic investors for equal treatment"). This
might be particularly salient when a tribunal determines government conduct has not violated international law,
as in Methanex. Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345
(2005), available at http://www.state.gov/sl/c5818.htm; but see Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little
Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2002, at Cl; Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch Advertisement, Fast Track
Attack on America's Values, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A5; Bill Moyers, Transcript: Trading DemocracyA Bill Moyers Special (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/ now/transcript/transcripttdfull.html
(suggesting that investment arbitration is illegitimate).
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whether investment arbitration might "spur domestic courts to compete for
49 the
business of resolving commercial disputes and thus improve their quality.'
2. Domestic Courts as a Complement to Investment Treaty Arbitration
National courts are an important complement to the resolution of investment
disputes. Arbitration does not occur in a vacuum, and the existence of investment
treaty arbitration does not eliminate the need to encourage the development of a
court system where rights are adjudicated in an impartial, fair, and predictable
manner. Investment treaty arbitration and national courts have a symbiotic
relationship. Fostering the development of the rule of law in national courts not
only develops local judicial institutions, but it also promotes confidence in the
overall process of resolving investment disputes.
National courts may become involved in investment treaty disputes in three
distinct ways. First, as many BITs permit investors to bring their claims in national
courts, under appropriate circumstances, investors may elect to litigate treaty
violations. 5 0° Not all investment treaties, however, adopt a model that permits
investors to choose between court litigation and arbitration. 5 ' Irrespective of whether
they are preceded by a cooling-off period that is presumably used to engage in
negotiations,'52 governments might reasonably consider moving away from a model
of mandatory arbitration of investment treaty disputes. This has several significant
benefits. As suggested earlier, it provides parties with an option to litigate before
national courts so that problems with public implications can be resolved in a public
forum where the dispute arose.'53 It also gives domestic courts an incentive to provide
independent and impartial adjudication of the cases on their dockets. By fostering
this general adherence to the rule of law, investors would presumably feel more
comfortable resolving their treaty claims before national courts.'54 Finally, it supports

149. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 119. The difficulty with this is that busy domestic courts of general
jurisdiction may have little incentive to compete with specialist arbitral tribunals for the resolution disputes
related to international law.
150. During a symposium at UC-Davis, Jim Loftis, a partner at Vinson & Elkins, suggested that if a
court system is "functioning" and "fair" and courts have demonstrated a "willingness to rule in favor of foreign
investors," he would advise a client to pursue their treaty claims in the national courts. In the context of a tax or
regulatory-based treaty claim against the United States, he suggested that litigating in U.S. courts would be
more cost-efficient and lead to a better result than arbitration. He nevertheless indicated that he was unaware of
an investor with an expropriation claim bringing their claims before a national court in the United States or
otherwise. UC-Davis Symposium, Romancing the Foreign Investor BIT by BIT, comments of Jim Loftis, Mar.
4, 2005, Disk 2 [CD-ROMs on file with author].
151. See supra note 31-33 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 38, 102 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 31, 150 and accompanying text.
154. Investors might be interested in resolving their disputes before courts if there is evidence that the
disputes might be resolved more quickly, cheaply, and fairly than arbitration. The relative values of the dispute
resolution options will depend on variables such as the potential court(s) involved, the nature of a potential
arbitral tribunal, and the factual and legal context of the dispute.
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procedural justice and democratic governance'" by giving parties the freedom to
choose the forum for resolving their disputes.'56
Second, national courts provide critical support to the investment arbitration
process. There are various points in the process where the integrity of local courts
can impact the efficacy of the dispute resolution process. While a court's role tends
to be limited in ICSID arbitration proceedings,'57 national courts have a role to play in
enforcing ICSID arbitration awards.'58 In the context of an ad hoc UNCITRAL
arbitration, national courts may find themselves playing a greater role. For example,
they might evaluate challenges relating to an arbitrator's impartiality and
independence' 9 or determine whether arbitrators awarded damages in a procedurally
improper manner. '6° Confidence in local courts supports confidence in the overall
process of resolving treaty claims. While some might suggest that interdependence
provides national courts with an opportunity to attack the integrity of the process,"'

155. See generally Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001); Nancy A. Welsh,
Making Deals in Court-ConnectedMediation: What's Justice Got to do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q 787 (2001).
The author is grateful to Professor Richard Ruben for his insights on this issue.
156. Offering incentives for other dispute resolution methods, such as mediation and conciliation, might
also be worth pursuing. See generally Jack J.Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in
Investor-State Disputes-A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2005); Franck, Dispute
Resolution Options, supra note 33.
157. The ICSID Convention provides the exclusive forum. ICSID Convention, supra note 40, at 524,
art. 26. This means that, for those situations where parties might go to local courts for aid, this option is
unavailable with ICSID arbitration. SCHREUER, CONVENTION, supra note 137, at 347-48. Nevertheless, in those
treaty claims proceeding under the UNCITRAL or Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Rules, there are still
opportunities for the assistance of local courts. Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond:
InternationalCommercialArbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 17 (2002).
158. ICSID Convention, supra note 40, at art. 54; see also SCHREUER, CONVENTION, supra note 137, at
1100-04.
159. English Arbitration Act of 1996, § 24, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996023.
htm [hereinafter English Arbitration Act] (permitting courts to remove arbitrators where "circumstances exist
that give rise to justifiable doubts as to [their] impartiality"); Swiss Private International Law Act on
International Arbitration, art. 180, in National Report on Switzerland in KLAUS PETER BERGER,
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION [hereinafter Swiss Arbitration Law] (permitting
party to challenge an arbitrator in court where "circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence"); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, June 21, 1985, Annex 1, art. 13, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, 24 I.L.M. 1302
(1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitrationlml-arb/ml-arb-e.pdf
[hereinafter
UNCITRAL Model Law] (permitting courts to hear challenges to arbitrators).
160. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002); English Arbitration Act, supra note 159, at §§ 67-69; Swiss Arbitration Law,
supra note 159, at art. 190; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 159, at art. 34. See generally William W. Park,
Illusion and Reality in InternationalForum Selection, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135 (1995).
161. There has been some concern about how national courts of Argentina may address enforcement of
ICSID arbitral awards. See Osvaldo J. Marzoti, Enforcement of Treaty Awards and National Constitutions (the
Argentinean Cases), 7 BuS. L. INT'L 226 (2006); Guido Santiago Tawil, Arbitration In Latin America: Current
Trends and Recent Developments, at http://www.bomchilgroup.org/argmar04.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2006)
(observing that "Argentine top officials have publicly argued the incompatibility of ICSID arbitration with the
Argentine Constitution, qualified ICSID arbitration as an immature regime, announced their will to return to the
Calvo doctrine abandoned during the 90's").
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the existence of robust national court systems, which adhere to the rule of law,
supports the fair resolution of investment disputes.
Third, even with the availability of courts for international law claims,
national courts are still critical venues for the resolution of investors' national
law disputes. Investment treaties do not prevent investors from bringing their
claims for violations of national law, which relate to their investments, before
national courts. Various investment treaty awards suggest that investors typically
refer their international law claims to international tribunals but simultaneously
refer domestic disputes to domestic courts. For example, in Occidental v.
Ecuador, the Republic of Ecuador changed its interpretation and application of
tax law. Occidental pursued its domestic remedies related to Ecuadorian
administrative law before an Ecuadorian national tribunal, and it simultaneously
initiated arbitration under the treaty
for the alleged violations of international
62
law. This behavior was acceptable.

Ultimately, even if one presumes that foreign investors are stakeholders who
are vital to promoting the rule of law and institutional integrity,' 63 their influence
does not exit the market purely by creating the right to arbitrate treaty claims.
Rather, properly valuing the potential role of national courts in resolving
investment disputes suggests that there is a strong incentive to develop the rule of
law in national courts and promote the integrity of the dispute resolution process.
3. Arbitrationas a Method to Maximize Party Control
Opting to arbitrate treaty claims may have little to do with escaping the
jurisdiction of local courts, but may instead be about maximizing party control.' 64

162.

Occidental Award, supra note 49, at

3-5, 32-33, 36, 46-48, 60-62.

163. One wonders whether foreign investors will be effective champions of rule of law reforms. A clear
and stable legal environment would no doubt benefit both domestic and international investments. See W.
Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74
BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 118 (2003) (noting that "BITs consciously seek to approximate in the developing,
capital-importing state the minimal legal, administrative, and regulatory framework that fosters and sustains
investment in industrialized capital-exporting states"). While this might suggest that multinational businesses
could be useful stakeholders in reform efforts, it is unwise to rely exclusively upon an individual's profitmaximizing goals to push countries down the path of reform. Daniels, supra note 143, at 24 n.52 (citing Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Contracting in Politically Risky Environments: International Business and Reform of the
State, Draft Working Paper). Foreign investors with certain relationships with government officials might
benefit from a lack of adherence to the rule of law while others might benefit financially from regulatory
uncertainty. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 43 (observing that firms "can skew policies in
their favor by formal or informal lobbying, controlling access to information or a variety of other strategies" by
"capturing" state influence "through informal and opaque channels of influence").
164. Parties may elect to arbitrate treaty claims because of perceived gaps in the integrity of domestic
courts. They may also be influenced by a perception that local courts lack public international law expertise or
that they will be more likely to win before a tribunal. See, e.g., Don Thompson, Lawsuits Want to Limit Free
Trade PactSeveral Groups Claim a NAFTA Provision Weakens State and Federal Laws, MONTEREY COUNTY
HERALD, Feb. 23, 2005, available at http://www.senate.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITrEE/SUB/BPINTER_
TRADE/_home/Article 2_23_05.doc (referring to a statement a foreign investor made related to a NAFTA
claim where he explained "[y]ou use whatever means is at your disposal, wherever you think you have the
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Even the United States and Canada, arguably jurisdictions with a strong tradition
of the rule of law, have had claims brought against them under NAFTA1 65 Using
arbitration may have more to do with party choice, control over the process, and
enforceability of an award.'66
Investors may wish to exercise their right to elect a forum that permits them
to exert control over how their dispute is resolved. Generally, opting for
arbitration increases parties' perceived control, which is often critical in
permitting parties to buy-in psychologically to the dispute resolution process;
this, in turn, can lead to a productive process and voluntary compliance with an
award. 167 Perhaps more specifically, arbitration permits the parties to control the
process by tailoring the procedures necessary for the adjudication of the specific
dispute. But party choice is best exemplified by the fact that parties have the
capacity to control the appointment of one of the arbitrators on the panel. While
this provides an opportunity to pick an arbitrator with expertise or experience in a

specific area and possibly make the arbitration more efficient, 68 this also means
parties can select arbitrators who may be likely to rule in their favor. While all
arbitrators must remain independent and impartial,
the possibility of indirect
greatest chance of success"); but see James May, Mining Company Files for NAFTA Arbitration, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 9, 2005, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096410498
(suggesting Glamis filed the claim because of speed concerns and not wanting to sue California in local courts).
These issues have not been evaluated empirically, but they are worthy of future consideration.
165. Weiler, supra note 114 (listing claims brought against the United States and Canada under
NAFTA). Domestic legislation in the United States and Canada, however, appears to preclude investors
bringing international law claims arising under NAFTA in either U.S. or Canadian domestic courts. See 19
U.S.C.A. § 3312(b)(2-3) (providing that "[n]o State Law, or application thereof, may be declared invalid.., on
the ground that [it] is inconsistent with [NAFTA], except in an action brought by the United States. . .. No
person other than the United States shall have any cause of action under [NAFTA]"); North American Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act 1993, c.44, § 6(2) (June 23, 1993), available at http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/en/N-23.8/text.html (providing that except for NAFTA Chapter 11, "no person has any cause of
action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to
enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by virtue" of NAFTA). The
same isnot true for Mexico. Mexico permits investors to elect to arbitrate or litigate before Mexican Courts. See
NAFrA, supra note 16, at Annex 1120.1 (providing that a non-Mexican investor can bring a Chapter II claim
in a Mexican court or administrative tribunal unless the investor has launched an arbitration). One wonders why
the United States and Canada felt the need to divert investment treaty claims from domestic courts. This
surprising democracy deficit stands in the face of both countries' rule of law traditions. See supra notes 152-56
and accompanying text (discussing how nonmandatory arbitration might promote the rule of law).
166. For those BITs that do not allow investors to elect arbitration over national courts, arbitration is
then the sole forum in which investors can directly bring their investment claims.
167. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME AND JUSTICE 283 (2003) (discussing the importance of the perceived fairness and effectiveness of legal
processes in achieving compliance with laws and legal outcomes); see also Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness
and Compliance with the Law, 133 J. ECON. & STATS. 219, 219, 222-27 (1997) (suggesting that compliance
with the law is linked to the legitimacy of the authorities and the procedural fairness of administering the law);
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 25-26
(1981 ) (observing that if parties "are not involved in the process, they are hardly likely to approve the product"
and instead arguing that parties should be given a stake in the process).
168. For example, if the issue is highly technical, parties will not need to spend as much time and money
educating an arbitrator who has special expertise.
169. For arbitration under the ICSID Convention, ICSID Convention Article 57 permits arbitrators to be
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control over the outcome is an element missing from court litigation and is
typically viewed as a desirable aspect of arbitration.
Investors also may be interested in neutrality. While investors may be
interested in having neutral and independent adjudicators, they are more likely
desire a neutral forum for dispute resolution that does not unfairly benefit either
party or create a "home field" advantage. In this sense, investment arbitration can
provide a geographical half-way house.
Investors also may be interested in the enforceability of the award. Both the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards and the ICSID Convention tried and tested mechanisms to enforce
tribunal awards. With the Hague Convention on Choice of Courts still unratified
and potentially subject to serious reservations, there is no equivalent streamlined
enforcement procedure for foreign court judgments. 7 Further, to the extent
investors have the option to arbitrate before ICSID, an entity affiliated with the
World Bank, there may be institutional gravitas that creates an incentive for
sovereigns to comply with ICSID awards, lest they have difficulty securing
future World Bank financing.
Ultimately, choosing to arbitrate investment disputes does not mean that
local courts are incapable of adhering to the rule of law and administering
impartial justice. The adjudicative fairness and neutrality of treaty arbitration
provides a useful model for national decisionmakers and usefully promote
adherence to the rule of law. Likewise, a domestic court system following the
rule of law provides a useful support to the integrity of the investment treaty
arbitration process. Ultimately, this symbiotic relationship has the capacity to
enhance investor confidence in the resolution of investment-related disputes and
provide a useful incentive for foreign investment.

challenged and removed for a "manifest lack of qualities" required by Article 14. ICSID Convention, supra note
40, at art. 57. Article 14 of the ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to be of "high moral character and
recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, [and] who may be relied upon to
exercise independent judgment." Id. at art. 14. Arbitration under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules contains a
similar requirement. See ICSID, Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, art. 8, available at http://www.
worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm. In addition, ICSID recently revised its arbitration rules and now
requires arbitrators to disclose circumstances that might cause the arbitrator's independent judgment to be
questioned and maintain an ongoing obligation to notify ICSID of any subsequent issues that arise. See ICSID,
Arbitration Rules, art. 6, available at http://worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm (last visited Dec. 27,
2006). For ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, arbitrators must be independent, impartial, and
disclose those circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence; an
arbitrator can be challenged and removed for failure to be independent or impartial. UNCITRAL Rules, supra
note 40, at arts. 9-12.
170. Jason Webb Yackee, Fifty Years Late to the Party? A New International Convention for NonArbitral Forum Selection Agreements, 23 INT'L LIr. QUART. 1 (2006); see also Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 37: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, http://www.hcch.net/
indexen.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Aug. 29, 2006) (indicating that there are no current
Contracting States to the convention).
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V. CONCLUSION

As there is mixed empirical and anecdotal evidence about the impact
investment treaties have on FDI, it is not surprising that the evidence with regard
to the specific effect of investment treaty arbitration is also unclear. Nevertheless,
the substantive and procedural rights offered in investment treaties have
important implications for foreign investment decisions and the rule of law, and
they are certainly worthy of ongoing consideration.
Investment treaty arbitration in particular has a unique role to play in the
future of foreign investment. Governments are likely to continue to focus upon
the capacity of dispute resolution mechanisms to affect investor confidence,
minimize investment risk, and create incentives for investing abroad.' 7'
Meanwhile, as the dispute resolution process at ICSID and other institutions
gains momentum, investors are likely to become more sensitized to the benefits
that treaty arbitration can offer both at the time of structuring the initial
investment and dealing with problems after they arise. 172 One should therefore
continue to evaluate the possibilities and pitfalls inherent in this new form of
dispute resolution to ensure that it plays a productive role in economic, legal,
political and social development.

171.
172.

See supra note 94 and accompanying text (referring to former Secretary Snow's remarks).
See supra notes 13, 59 and accompanying text.

